

THE UNDERGROUND

Journal of Undergraduate Research


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EDITORIAL POLICY

THE UNDERGROUND is a peer-reviewed academic journal that publishes researched based student work in both written and multimedia format. The goal of this journal is to provide an outlet which allows St. Lawrence students to share the results of their work with the rest of the academic community. All submissions must be original. The journal is published online and in print once a semester. Each submission will undergo a rigorous editorial process based on a series of blind peer reviews. Submissions may be subject to a series of revisions. All work must be submitted in an electronic copy. Students may submit multiple works per semester. Submissions may include but are not limited to written pieces (i.e. plays, research papers, creative pieces, etc.) and visual art (i.e. photography, video of performances, etc). Submissions must be sent in by the time determined and announced by the editorial board each semester.

ON THE COVER



ON THE COVER:
Photo credit to Sonja Wolke

LETTER TO THE READERS

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the thirteenth edition of The Underground Journal! As always, a tremendous amount of hard work went into the creation of this semester's journal. I would like to thank Josephine Brown '19 for all her consistent hard work as Managing Editor/Graphic Designer of the journal; getting this issue into print would not have been possible without her. This semester we had a great variety of submissions, and we are excited to share the work of each of our talented contributors!

The journal begins with a look at local traditions in an essay entitled "Myth or Reality?:

The Preservation of the North Country Dairy Princess Hides Current Local Conditions," by Julianne DeGuardi. Jenna Mead's, "Capturing the Wind: Validating NIMBY-based Perceptions towards The Block Island Wind Farm," comes next, exploring the "not in my backyard" movement on Block Island, and how compromises are reached between officials and wind farm developers. In the following essay, "Materialization of Secession: The Case of Thailand,"

Allison Cunningham explores the minority population in Thailand, resulting from the lack of integration of the different cultures of Thailand's three provinces. The next piece, "The Homosexual "in Tent": The Complexity of the Boy Scouts of America's Ban on Gay Members," by Henry Leibers, explores the past ban on homosexual members in the Boy Scouts, and the resulting homophobia that continues even after the ban was lifted. Next is Lauren Nolan's definition of what classifies as "high art," in "Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism." Finally, this issue closes with Sydney Fallon's "Exploring the Economic Development Divergence in Northern and Southern Italy: Testing the Impact of Civicness," presenting the differing economic states of Northern and Southern Italy due to differing levels of civicness.

On behalf of all of us at The Underground, we sincerely hope you enjoy our newest installment!

Regards,

Kathryn Corbitt'18
Editor-In-Chief

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Myth or Reality?: The Preservation of the North Country Dairy Princess Hides Current Local Conditions

ABSTRACT: The dairy industry in New York State has been a lucrative component of the state's economy for decades, especially in St. Lawrence County, located in Northern NY. As a result of this economic success, local residents have developed a strong sense of pride for the dairy industry, which has influenced the region culturally as well as economically. Within the last three decades however, the dairy industry has undergone significant changes due to global, political, and economic restructuring that has disrupted traditional small-scale family dairy farming practices in this region, as well as in the US as a whole. These changes have led to the development of large-scale industrial dairy farms as well as a demand for migrant labor on dairy farms throughout the US, even as far north as St. Lawrence County. However, as the theoretical perspectives of Cultural Studies theorists, Raymond Williams, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, and Arjun Appadurai uphold, despite such alterations with the industry, local residents continue to celebrate and maintain their sense of pride and identity associated with the traditional small-scale dairy farming industry in this region.

KEYWORDS: Dairy Princess, migrant labor, residual culture, emergent culture, globalization

The dairy industry is New York State's leading agricultural sector, and St. Lawrence County, in Northern NY, is the state's second largest dairy producer (Governor Andrew M. Cuomo) (Haverty). Thus, the dairy industry has been, and continues to be, "one of the biggest engines of the state economy...it's what's keeping rural Upstate New York alive" ("Meet Your New York State Dairy Princess"). In St. Lawrence County and throughout the North Country (Northern New York State), there is a long history and strong sense of pride in the dairy industry, which has been manifested through the annual tradition, since 1964, of selecting a "Dairy Princess" to represent the industry (Haverty). The Dairy Princess is often the daughter of a local dairy farmer and is responsible for traveling throughout St. Lawrence County to promote the industry and its products (Haverty). Although the United States dairy industry has experienced significant transformations since the 1980s, which have reverberated throughout New York State, and St. Lawrence County specifically, the Dairy Princess has continued to remain a prominent tradition as well a vital aspect of the region's culture and identity. The various perspectives of Cultural Studies theorists including, Raymond Williams, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, and Arjun Appadurai provide comprehensive explanations for how the tradition of the Dairy Princess has maintained its symbolic importance within the North Country Dairy industry, despite the transformations within the industry produced by globalization that have introduced new flows and relations to this region.

Brief History on North Country Dairy Industry Transformation

Beginning in the 1980s, the New York dairy industry experienced significant changes, along with other worldwide economic and agricultural restructuring efforts involving deregulation brought about by the onset

of the “Age of High Globalization.” The elimination of New Deal era regulations that had protected local milk processors enabled out-of-state milk processors to enter the New York market, which reduced prices, and put pressure on smaller farmers as large processors began consolidating their market control within the dairy industry (The Economic Cost of Food Monopolies 22). As a result, farmers no longer have the option to sell, market, and process their milk through local independent cooperatives and processing plants. Instead, most farmers are members of the largest cooperative, Dairy Farmer’s of America (DFA), or market their milk through Dairy Marketing Services (DMS), which is a milk marketing partnership between DFA and Dairylea Cooperative (a Syracuse, NY based cooperative). Both DFA and DMS then sell the milk to the largest processing company in the US, Dean Foods, which by the 2000s controlled 70% of the milk bottling market in the Northeast (The Economic Cost of Food Monopolies 22, 24). Such market consolidation has caused small farmers in the North Country to become affected by global milk prices, which has limited their ability to thrive and compete because of fewer opportunities to negotiate their prices (“Dairy Farm Workers in Northern New York”). As a result of these changes, New York State has lost roughly two-thirds of its dairy farms since 1980, and the ones that have remained have expanded (“Report Says Consolidation Hurting Farms and Communities”). St. Lawrence County alone lost 77% of its dairy farms between 1982 and 2007, and the farms that have remained have tripled in size from 43 to 120 cows; by 2007, one-third of the cows in the county lived on farms with over 500 cows (The Economic Cost of Food Monopolies 25). Furthermore, along with market consolidation and lack of price negotiation, Federal Milk Marketing Orders, which determine the price dairy farmers receive, do not account for production costs; therefore, several farmers on large farms have been forced to minimize labor costs and have resorted to hiring Hispanic migrant workers, who are largely invisible in the region due to high border security. However, despite these drastic alterations over the last thirty years, which have created an influx of new global flows and relations within the North Country, the Dairy Princess maintains its prominence as a symbol of the region’s dairy industry.

Williams

As a Marxist, Raymond Williams discusses the limitations of Marx’s base-superstructure model, which constitutes the social formation within a society. The base serves as the economic productive substructure of society, while the superstructure contains the ruling intellectual class, and institutions that own the means of production (Marx and Engels 9). Marx claims that within this social formation class conflict develops, which leads to an eventual overthrow of the system, in which the working classes gain control over the means of production. However, in many societies this “revolution” has never occurred and the social formation has continued to reproduce itself. Thus, Williams employs a more flexible rather than dogmatic approach in order to explain this phenomenon. He argues that a base is not a static or fixed entity, but rather a dynamic process that involves, “the specific activities of men in real social and economic relationships” (Williams 6). As a result, as the capitalist system is reproduced, the superstructure, which produces the dominant hegemony, is flexible, constantly modified, and incorporates different aspects of the base in order to maintain “real and constant change” and prevent revolutionary change (Williams 8).

Williams describes the concept of residual and emergent culture in order to further explain the flexibility of the base-superstructure model and its resistance to revolutionary change. Residual culture refers to “experiences, meanings, and values which...are nevertheless lived and practiced on the basis of the residue...of some previous social formation” that are either incorporated or not incorporated into the dominant culture (Williams 10). The Dairy Princess can be seen as a public expression of the residual culture of the North Country dairy industry. Although within the North Country most small-scale family dairy farms have been replaced by larger industrialized farms, each year St. Lawrence County continues to select a Dairy Princess, who is celebrated through the annual Dairy Princess Parade on Main Street in Canton, NY. This tradition serves as an important manifestation of the region’s history and culture, which subsequently continues to serve as a crucial component of the local residents’ identity.

On the other hand, Williams defines emergent culture as, “new meanings and values, new practices,

new significances and experiences,” that “are continually being created” (Williams 11). Within the North Country dairy industry, Williams would identify two distinct types of emergent culture. Throughout the 1980s, the appearance of large industrialized dairy farms that replaced several small-scale family dairy farms represents a form of emergent culture that has been successfully incorporated into the dominant culture of dairy farming in the North Country. The successful incorporation of industrialized dairy farming, which has created a demand for low production costs, has introduced another form of emergent culture in this region, the employment and presence of Hispanic migrant workers. However, unlike the emergence and incorporation of industrialized dairies, this population of workers has not been successfully incorporated into the dominant culture, which Williams would refer to as an “emergent not incorporated culture” (Williams 11). The majority of North Country residents are highly unaware of the existence of this population in the region because some of the workers are undocumented and rarely leave the farms due to high border security. Consequently, these issues have significantly contributed to the lack of incorporation of this emergent culture in the North Country, which further upholds and contributes to the incorporation of, and close identification with, the residual culture that is embodied through the Dairy Princess.

Barthes

In his book *Mythologies*, Barthes describes myth as a “second-order semiological system,” which is built off of pre-existing language or signs (Barthes 223). Through the creation of myth, the reality, or the original meaning of a sign, is emptied out and replaced with a new meaning, or a new signified, which creates a new sign. This new sign, which is a distortion of reality, becomes “naturalized” – accepted as true – and goes unquestioned by members of society (Barthes 240, 255). Through Barthes theory, the North Country Dairy Princess can be interpreted as myth. Prior to the restructuring in the 1980s, the Dairy Princess served to represent the face of the region’s dairy industry, at a time when the industry was predominantly constituted by small family dairy farms. However, since the transformations in the dairy industry beginning in the 1980s, the Dairy Princess no longer represents the reality of the face of the current dairy industry, which is predominantly constituted by large industrial farms that employ migrant labor. Instead, the Dairy Princess represents a sense of local identity and pride that is affiliated with a sense of nostalgia for the dairy industry of the past, and serves as a celebration of traditional rural life, which subsequently distorts the current reality of the industry. The Hispanic migrant workers, for instance, do not participate in the annual Dairy Princess parade. Their absence from this tradition enables the myth of the Dairy Princess to become naturalized, and the image of the dairy industry represented through the Dairy Princess is left unquestioned, despite its contradictions with, and distortion of, the reality of the current industry.

Furthermore, the “wholesome young woman” who is selected as the Dairy Princess is responsible for promoting the “pure” and “wholesome” local dairy products, such as “white frothy milk” (Haverty) (“Meet Your New York State Dairy Princess”). These notions of purity and wholesomeness further distort the reality of the industry today, which is far more complex due to mechanization on farms and dependence on migrant labor. In addition, the Dairy Princess serves as an inspiration for young girls throughout the community who associate the concept of a princess with “brave and courageous” (and usually white) Disney Princesses (Haverty). Through slogans such as “bippity boppity moo,” the Dairy Princess brings a magical and fantastical aura to the dairy industry, that helps recall and maintain the jovial essence of the traditional family dairy farm, which creates a sense of hope, pride, and nostalgia within the region for the continuation of small family farms, despite drastic changes within the industry. The association of a princess with creamy, white, pure and wholesome dairy products portrays the industry as being equally untainted and wholesome, and providing livelihood and contentment within the local community, as this industry has historically done. The Dairy Princess can be interpreted as myth because as the tradition has continued to the present, new meanings have been attached to this symbol in order to distort the current face of the industry and preserve the pride and identity associated with the industry’s past.

Althusser

Although Barthes claims that, “myth hides nothing,” myth functions through visibility, and that which is visible is a distorted view of the reality that has become “naturalized” and perceived as the real conditions of society (Barthes 240). Such distortion suggests that there is something “hidden” or invisible underneath the myth based ‘reality,’ from which our attention is being diverted. Althusser’s concept of Ideology, which he claims is individual’s “imaginary relation... to the real relations in which they live,” coincides with the notion that there is something invisible on the other side of myth (Althusser 165). Similar to Williams, as a Marxist, Althusser also provides modifications to the base-superstructure model and an explanation for how the capitalist system continues to reproduce itself and not be overthrown by a “revolution.” Althusser claims that ideology is, “a pure illusion, a pure dream...nothingness. All reality is external to it,” and is an imaginary construction, or reflection of the real material conditions within a society, to which humans have an imaginary relation (Althusser 159,160,165). Althusser further contends that as a result of this imaginary relation to real relations, humans are alienated from the actual material conditions of their existence, which coincides with Marx’s original notion of alienation from the means of production within the capitalist system (Althusser 163, 164). Within the North Country Dairy industry, local residents and dairy consumers have an imaginary connection to the real relations within the dairy industry; they are often unaware of the existence of Hispanic migrant workers on the production end of the industry. This imaginary association enhances the invisibility of migrant workers and helps construct as well as uphold the myth of the Dairy Princess, which represents a distorted view of the current reality of the dairy industry by leaving absent the presence of migrant workers that serve as the base of the industry.

Furthermore, in applying Althusser’s concept of ideology, there are two possibilities to describe migrant worker’s situation on farms. Based on interviews conducted with migrant workers by the organization, Traditional Arts in Upstate New York (TAUNY) for their exhibit, “Dairy Farm Workers in Northern New York,” many of the workers claimed that migrating to the US to find work was their only option in order to make sufficient money to pay to finish their education or to acquire more resources for themselves and their families (“Dairy Farm Workers in Northern New York”). In the interviews, the workers claimed that they enjoy and feel proud of their work on the farms, although it is often boring because they are not able to leave (“Dairy Farm Workers in Northern New York”). These responses indicate that the workers may have an imaginary relation to their real material conditions and are not fully aware of the plight of their working conditions — consisting of long hours and low wages, which most domestic workers are unwilling to accept — because they are focused to make and send money home. Althusser would argue that in this case the workers are “interpellated” or placed into a specific subject position — migrant dairy farm workers who receive low wages — within the North Country society, and subsequently submit to and accept this position because they are not fully aware of the real conditions of that particular position, which prevents them from rebelling against the system (Althusser 174). However, if the migrant workers were to become aware of their true material conditions and reject their social positions, the state protects itself from potential rupture of the system through the establishment of an RSA, Repressive State Apparatus (Althusser 145). In the North Country, the RSA functions through Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) as well as other border patrol enforcement measures, which prevents the migrant workers from leaving the farms, speaking out for their rights on their own, and engaging in a “revolution.” Thus, whether or not the migrant workers are fully conscious of their genuine material conditions, they do not pose a threat to the system because of the function of the RSA. Consequently, the RSA enhances the invisibility of the migrant workers, which further upholds the myth of the Dairy Princess.

Appadurai

Through a contemporary global lens in the context of late 20th century globalization, Appadurai describes globalization as an amalgamation of global “flows,” and its various dimensions: “mediascapes,” “technoscapes,” “financescapes,” “ideoscapes,” and “ethnoscapes,” that operate through the “disjunctures” among “scapes” (Appadurai 33). A scape is defined as a particular lens or means through which the world is viewed that is gener-

ated by the aforementioned dimensions of global flows. Scapes, “are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors,” which establishes the disjunctures among these scapes (Appadurai 33). These disjunctures, or the different ways of understanding the world, become the foundations of “imagined worlds...the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups” (Appadurai 33). The disjunctures among, and the imagined worlds created by, the financescapes, ethnoscapes, and mediascapes that constitute the North Country dairy industry further explain the relations within the industry and its various “visible” and “invisible” components.

The financescape, or flow of global capital, within the North Country dairy industry has shifted significantly in recent decades as corporate consolidation of the milk market has placed financial pressure on farmers, who then become dependent on migrant workers in order to minimize labor costs. In addition, economic disparities in several Latin America countries resulting from free trade agreements with the US have further necessitated emigration from these countries. Thus the conjunction of these two financescapes has developed a new ethnoscapes, or movement of people, within this region, which is interpreted in various ways and has constructed different imagined worlds throughout the North Country. The workers themselves view their migration as an opportunity to work and make money to send home to their families and to build a better future for themselves upon their return home. However, the employers on the farms see migrant labor as a means of maintaining a reliable workforce and keeping production costs low, in order to enable their business and to allow the overall local economy of the region to thrive. The difference between the goals of the employers and the migrant workers represents a large disjuncture within this ethnoscapes and subsequently the creation of two very distinct imagined worlds regarding the dairy industry.

Furthermore, the mediascapes, or flow of images and cultural forms, that represent the North Country dairy industry, such as, North Country Now and the Watertown Daily Times have published several stories about the Dairy Princess tradition and the annual parade. However, prior to 2015, in which a protest for migrant farm worker’s rights was covered, these sources have neglected to incorporate information about the migrant workers on the production end of the industry. Although NCPR is one of the few media outlets in the region that has covered several stories about the Hispanic migrant workers, they have also published numerous stories with interviews from various Dairy Princesses themselves to promote this tradition, without discussing the role of migrant workers in the industry. This establishes a further disjuncture between the imagined worlds of farmers and migrant workers created by the region’s financescape and ethnoscapes, and the imagined worlds of North Country residents and dairy consumers constructed by the mediascape. This mediascape maintains the invisibility of migrant workers and upholds the myth of the Dairy Princess that continues to serve as a public expression of the sense of purity and nostalgia for the traditional rural past within the industry.

Conclusion

The application and interweaving of the theoretical concepts of Williams, Barthes, Althusser, and Appadurai, provide explanations for how the tradition of the Dairy Princess has been maintained and continues to serve as an important symbol of the North Country dairy industry despite the various transformations driven by globalization that have developed within the industry over the last thirty years. Although such transformations have introduced new flows and relations throughout the North Country, the continued presence of the Dairy Princess serves to preserve the sense of pride in and celebration of the region’s traditional rural past while neglecting to incorporate the current realities within the industry.

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Jenna Mead

Capturing the Wind: Validating NIMBY-based Perceptions towards the Block Island Wind Farm

ABSTRACT: Renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar, and hydroelectric, have enormous potential; however, development projects surrounding them often meet backlash from local inhabitants. These individuals typically do not have a problem with the project itself, but merely its location – a stance referred to as “Not in my backyard,” or NIMBY. The Block Island wind farm is an example of just such a situation. The island community is extremely committed to conserving their land, so much so that over 47 percent of the island’s space is conserved and protected from development. By analyzing public letters and polls, the community sentiment behind the NIMBY attitude on Block Island becomes not only clear, but validated, and allows for a productive collaboration between officials on the island and the wind farm developers.

KEYWORDS: Block Island, sustainable energy, NIMBY, wind energy

Introduction

New Shoreham, often referred to as Block Island, is located 13 miles off the coast of Rhode Island. The place is known as the “island time forgot” to some, and is home to less than a thousand year-round residents with a swelling summer population (“About New Shoreham,” 2007). When Deepwater Wind began its development of an offshore wind farm in 2008, residents quickly formed strong opinions towards the five-turbine project (Kuffner, 2014).

There is a need for the development of sustainable energy technologies, but renewable energy has its tradeoffs (Mooney, 2016). Though there is vast potential in energies such as wind, solar, and hydroelectric, these options require further development of the earth’s surfaces while impacting local ecosystems and communities. The action of development habitually meets backlash from the local area residents who must cohabitate with renewable energy technologies (RETs). When citizens generally support sustainable energy but oppose it if the development of such technology is in the proximity of an individual or community, scholars have termed this stance “Not in my backyard” (NIMBY). (Devine-Wright, 2004, p, 31).

There are abundant examples of NIMBY-ism through the development of many sorts of facilities, such as prisons or nuclear power plants, but an increase in the cases have come from the development of RETs (Burningham, Barnett, and Walker, 2015). The case of the Block Island Wind Farm presents a microcosm of NIMBY-ism, and the communication of RETs reception and formed opinions in this case is worth analysis.

The formation of public opinion, the voicing of these views, and the social environment that fosters these beliefs plays a vital role in future energy developments. The analysis of the voiced public opinion of Block Island residents during the construction of the Block Island Wind Farm demonstrates that NIMBY based opposition should be assigned legitimacy in RET development processes. This analysis goes on to show that an understanding of community members’ rationales can lead to productive collaboration between local residents and RET development groups.

The Block Island project has broken ground on a new energy category: offshore wind. The country will only be able to seize this energy potential with effective communication strategies practiced by developers of RETs. This analysis of Block Island residents' opinions points to the reasoning behind, and formation of, public perception regarding the development of the nation's first offshore wind farm.

Literature Review

The Block Island Wind Farm

The Block Island community and its people offer a unique view of NIMBY-ism within an isolated environment. Multiple generations of families have resided on the island since its establishment in 1661, spawning an interdependent culture among residents (Gibbons, 2013, p.1482). Residents rely on each other due to their remote location. Though the island is home to only a small year-round population, inhabitants express their commitment to the island and each other. As one resident writes, "Just as Block Island is characterized by a persistent sense of place, so too it has a deep sense of solidarity within its tiny community," (Ortel, 2014). The culture of the island is an interwoven network of people who care about the place that they live and the people who live there. The community's commitment to the island itself is demonstrated through the island's land conservancy movement. More than 47 percent of the island's space is conserved and protected from development. The resistance to the further development of the island for tourism, the island's main industry, and maintenance of pristine, open spaces led to the island's claim that it is the "last great place" ("Block Island Conservancy Founded," 1972). Now completed and nearing operational mode, the Block Island Wind Farm consists of five 600-foot turbines just over three nautical miles off the island's southeast coast. It is expected to generate 30 megawatts of renewable electricity and become the main provider of energy for the island.

During the Block Island Wind Farm's approval process, mainland Rhode Island residents have pursued legal battles because their electricity rates would increase due to the costly construction. In contrast, Block Island residents, who have historically paid some of the country's highest rates for electricity, are set to see a decrease in electric rates from the wind farm (Gibbons, 2013, pg. 1482). The Block Island Wind Farm comes from a push in 2006, when the then-Governor launched a plan for the state to receive 15 percent of its energy from wind (pg. 1481). He rewrote and signed legislature that stopped construction on wind farms in nearby states.

NIMBY Perspectives

Over the past twenty years, the wind energy industry in the United States has grown dramatically with four percent of the nation's energy coming from wind turbines (Gillis, 2016). The advancement of RETs, such as wind farms, often gather popular public support, but projects meet strong opposition once specific plans start to take fruition. Scholars are engaged in an ongoing conversation about the formation of public perception of RETs, particularly opinions that draw on NIMBY appeals. The interest lies in the how these beliefs come to be, how they are rationalized, and how those in power react to these opinions.

When it comes to the topic of NIMBY-ism, some scholars argue that NIMBY based opposition is a not a valid claim to hinder the development of RETs. In the United States, popular polls show nearly 71 percent of individuals support the country's growth in the wind industry ("Gallup poll social series: Environment," 2013), but developers face fierce opposition with most project proposals (Bell, Gray, & Hagget, 2005, p. 461). The case of Block Island was no exception. In 2011 when the project proposals were being scouted for the regions, a majority of the island's residents either somewhat or strongly favored a wind farm in the region (West, 2011), but as Deepwater moved further along in the approval process, adamant disapproval arose from the community.

When discussing public perception, some say the label of NIMBY comes with a deep negative connotation (Burningham, Barnett & Walker, 2015, p. 247). Developers and government officials avoid its use because it often generates stronger opposition (Wolsink, 1989, pg. 12). This dodging of "sensitive language" can stymie collaboration when the local residents' voices are not valued in the discussion of siting RETs (Burningham et al., p.248).

Others argue that public perception is formed beyond the scope of NIMBY and that the term refers to an uneducated public (Bell et al.). Burningham's study of opposition to offshore wind in the United Kingdom focuses on an array of knowledge deficits as an explanation for limited local support for projects as apposed to NIMBY-based opposition. He offers direction for developers of these projects. According to Burningham, "the deficits of understanding, information, and experience they (developers) identify might be filled by education or the provision of appropriate 'experience,' thus potentially transforming opponents into supporters," (pg. 257). This argument essentially states that those opposed to the project can be "educated" into supporting developments. This view of NIMBY-ism sees oppositional viewpoints as merely condition of ignorance. This opinion overlooks the irony that communities are educated about the places that they live and that developers are unaware of the way the people live within the spaces developers look to build.

The academic conversation of public perception can be traced further back in history by studying the development of earlier RET projects. These are worth considering because across time the public has become generally more knowledgeable about the technology, as well as more aware of the need for renewable energy sources (Burningham et al). Wolsink offers a multidimensional method of understanding public perceptions towards wind farms that assigns greater significance to NIMBY reasoning. This multidimensional approach brings together the multiple attitudes towards the various aspects of particular developments including attitudes towards; the public policy allowing for development; the proximity of farm to individuals' homes; and lastly, the given size of the turbines. In Wolsink's view, "The weight of visual impact turns out to be the main source of opposition. Visual arguments are subjective but as real as other arguments. People only know that using visual criteria is probably not the best bet in formal decision-making procedures. So there is no reason at all to believe that the opposition against wind turbines is irrational" (pg. 12). The formation of opinion based on visual effects cannot be ignored as it is the overwhelming basis for opposition. The physical landscape of a community generates daily emotional responses from those who live in the area.

The multifaceted perception of wind turbines builds off the emotional response that individuals have every time they see the developments. According to Burningham (2015) and Bell (2005), the avoidance of NIMBY discourse overlooks the largest factor in public perception: visual and emotional effects. With this gap, existing project timelines are extended, more money is spent, and citizens can feel alienated from the decision making process. With the great potential of wind energy off the coast of the United States, a deeper understanding of, and appreciation for, the local-based opposition is necessary.

The academic conversation continues to grow in complexity when the effects of development of RETs threaten tourism and property values. This was seen through the opposition to Cape Wind, an offshore wind farm proposed in Cape Cod, Massachusetts (Firestone, Kempton, and Krueger, 2009). Like Block Island, Cape Cod's economy relies heavily on seasonal coastal tourism, but surveys of tourists did not find evidence that presence of wind turbines would deter their choice to visit the area (Lilley, Firestone & Kempton, 2010, p. 18). Block Island resident's views resonated with the Cape resident's situation. These types of oppositions are NIMBY in nature as there are individually and economically motivated.

The gridlock between political power and community resistance has stalled the construction of Cape Wind. Deepwater Wind was able to push forward in the development of the Block Island Wind Farm with the support of the state government of Rhode Island, but also because of its adherence to public participation process (Gibbons, p.1480).

Community Collaboration

The influence of public participation on environmental decision making is comprised of the right to information, the right to comment publicly and the right to stand against government actions (Cox, 2010, p.84). The extent to which government agencies, developers and local residents can collaborate when the public takes on an active role in attempting to influence decision-making can significantly influence the acceptance or opposition of a given project (p.128).

To successfully "collaborate" is more than having a mere conversation. Cox says that all parties involved

must be granted ample and equal opportunity to voice views, and the decisions made are a consensus of collaborators. This voicing can occur in many forms. Written comment or speaking at public hearings inform all involved viewpoints, and productive collaborating lends equal value to all views that are voiced. Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) state, “[Collaboration] efforts actively involved people throughout a planning or problem-solving process so that they learned together, understood constraints and developed creative ideas, trust and relationship,” (p.105). If developers make these efforts, they can break down walls set up by the us versus them mentalities that community members may feel towards outside developers, and lead to more effective and timely generation of support.

The nation’s need for renewable energy development will continue to increase as fossil fuels become depleted and public concern for climate change continues to grow (Gillis, 2016). As it does, many communities will persist in the trend of local opposition. By using Block Island as an example of NIMBY-ism, it becomes apparent that the term represents opinions that should be accounted for and attended to for meaningful environmental discourse and progress, though the case does not present an instance that it was. NIMBY-ism has been given a stake in the formation of perception towards RETs before, and an analysis of Block Island revisits these findings. The understanding of a community’s attachment to place, the preservation of that place and to the well-being of other members, helps to explain the complexities of NIMBY that others overlook. This knowledge is critical in a time of growth for renewable technology.

Methods

In order to capture Block Island resident’s reactions to the Block Island Wind Farm, this research analyzes the public’s published opinions in the island’s weekly local paper, The Block Island Times. Since its foundation in 1970, the paper has served as a collaborative expression of the island (“About Us,” 2016). The paper took on a vital role throughout the development of the Block Island Wind Farm, acting as a liaison with government officials, developers and island residents. The process was documented through comprehensive coverage of events, as well as through the publication of resident’s letters to the editor.

Using published letters has been found to be an effective technique to monitor community standing because newspapers publish the direct words of citizens as they explain their positions in letters to the editor (Landert and Jucker, 2011). By studying examples of published materials, a greater understanding of why local residents feel the way they do about green energy developments came to light. This research takes four examples of letters and analyzes the arguments made. The letters each present the writer’s opinions, beliefs and reasoning. Through a lens of political economy, the examination of the letters gives attention to the existence of NIMBY attitude in the voice of the public, while commenting on how the writers sought to be heard by the political entities of government officials and developers. The study comments on how important it is for those in power to pay attention to community perception regardless of its root when developing RETs.

With the scholarly literature available only tracking public opinion and collaboration to RET development prior to the construction of the Block Island Wind Farm, this analysis brings to light how the voice of the public was exhibited in the case of Block Island. The public voice communicates the values and opinions of the individuals living near the country’s first offshore wind farm, which is valuable as the nation seeks to continue offshore development. This analysis of the public’s NIMBY-based opposition brings attention to the need for these opinions to be more significantly valued in the development process. This research offers one theory of how public perception of renewable energy developments are formed and communicated. The Block Island case includes a community struggle, but also an eventual acceptance. It is a “first of its kind” phenomenon that fills in some of the gaps in the anti-NIMBY perceptions of public opposition to wind farms supported by Burningham et al. (2015), Devine-Wright (2005), and Firestone et al. (2012). With this, a more complete view of public sentiment, future projects of RETs can be successfully introduced, built collaboratively and implemented within communities.

The analysis utilizes Campbell’s (1997) form of rhetorical analysis to fully comprehend the public’s voice

and better know the reasoning behind Block Island’s residents’ opinion. First, a descriptive analysis of the given letters forms a familiarity with all rhetorical aspects of the debate. This included dissection of (1) tone, which identified attitudes, (2) purpose, which showed reasoning in writer’s positions, (3) structure that identified the presentation of opinion, (4) supporting materials, which showed how other sources were tied in, (5) strategies labeled by the language choices, (6) audience, which classified who the speaker was addressing, and (7) the construction of the speaker, which showed what a writer’s social position did to effect their message.

The next step of this study placed these texts from Block Island within the historical context that produced them. The context includes the moment in time and the place. This research used the social world of Block Island to help frame a reading of the texts considering the community audience of the letters. This work also distinguished the numerous persuasive forces of the given situation of economic and political nature. It goes on to make an academic and social criticism focusing on the role of the political economy at the time of development. The social criticism assigns this a greater value to community’s concerns within the moment and place of Block Island, and the academic criticism places the texts into the larger conversation of public perception of RETs. Lastly, an application of these criticisms allows the formation of theory surrounding the shape and formation of public perception of development. This analysis of four community letters taps into a community’s perception and draws one theory from it. These findings provide evidence for the improvement of communication techniques for future RET projects.

Analysis

During the development of the Block Island Wind Farm, the pages of the Block Island Times read like a high stakes drama. The front pages reported the latest progress and agreements between government officials and developers, while inside the paper, editorials and letters to the editor voiced strong opposition. The opposition followed the form of characteristically NIMBY-based reason. This was executed in various ways, but most notably through a general acceptance of wind development but demonstrated opposition to a nearby proposal based on the belief that Block Island is an exceptional place absolving it from development, and an argument based on personal economic concerns, rather than public economic growth. These embodiments of NIMBY-ism had to be acknowledged by wind farm developers for successful collaboration.

Anywhere But Here

One way the letters upheld the NIMBY techniques was through an agreement surrounding the progressive nature of wind energy as a technology, but a fierce objection to the Block Island proposal. In one letter the author stated, “Two years ago, I went on a cruise in the Baltic. Everywhere we went there were rows of a dozen or so windmills. Denmark, Russia, Estonia and Sweden, all along the coast. The technology is old now” (Dupont, 2010). This letter seems to accept the wind farm’s legitimacy, but goes on to argue the farm will have dramatic negative effects on the community. The public polling found general community support for the proposed farm, but a series of outcries against the farm as the plans progressed. Initial polling in 2010 found 84 percent of voters on the island were in favor of a wind farm (Baute, 2010). This majority support was proportionally demonstrated in the analyzed texts.

A Collective Community

Another way the general acceptance, but specific denial of plans, was demonstrated in the published letters was through the writer’s beliefs that the uniqueness of the island qualifies it as exceptional, and therefore it should be protected from development. This reasoning stems from a root of NIMBY perceptions that should not be disregarded. Many of the letters mention the long-term conversancy of the island as a juxtaposition to the grand development just off the island’s coast. One letter, which used a visual technique to demonstrate what the farm would look like, read “If approved, Block Island, designated by The Nature Conservancy as one of the ‘Last Great Places’ for its preservation of open spaces, which include its coastline, would be negatively impacted by an industrial project consisting of six to eight wind turbines that will be each 500 feet tall and 45 feet wide,” (Ives, 2014). The use of language and naming of the island, as ‘the last great place’ is significant. The name serves as a

uniting force within the community. By naming Block Island in such a way, Ives seeks to separate Block Island from all other places, and demonstrates her belief that the island is unlike all others. The overall view of the community is that the island is a unique entity bringing political power to the citizens. The collective common naming gives the people something worth defending.

Because Block Island is so isolated, it creates a culture in which community members are proud of where they live, and feel ownership over it. The small town nature of the island fosters a community that is resistant to outsiders. All of the letters studied begin with an introduction that informs the audience of the writer's ethos. This symbolizes the community emphasis on belonging. One letter begins, "I am a year-round resident of Block Island. I am a former member of the Town Council for New Shoreham and former Finance Director for the Town government...most important, I own and operate Block Island Grocery" (Balsler, 2014). This letter stresses the social position of the individual, but the inclusion of that role means that the audience will be more likely to listen because of it. The collective mentality of the residents forms an attachment to the place where they reside. This attachment forms a belief of exceptional-ism for Block Island that, in the eyes of its residents, qualifies it for preservation.

Personal Costs

Another way NIMBY based attitudes were formed through the letters, was through the individual's views of personal economic impacts from the project. In terms of Block Island, when community members wrote about how the wind farm would personally cost them, their opinions fell into the NIMBY category. One letter outlines an individual's personal loss of property value because of the view of the wind turbines. It reads, "My land value is more than \$500,000 above what its value would be were it located inland. Since the premium is because of 'the view', I believe, with the installation of the near-shore Deepwater wind turbines, the \$500,000 would be lost" (Mellor, 2014). This letter serves as evidence of NIMBY-ism because the writer does not argue against the turbines themselves but rather against the negative personal economic effects the wind farm's existence might have on him.

The letters published during the development and approval process of the Block Island Wind Farm depict a less approving public than earlier local polls. An analysis of the letters shows that NIMBY based beliefs were evident in the published voice of the Block Island people. But what the letters also show is the rationale attached to these beliefs. Community members were able to explain their standings and draw support from their fellow citizens. This technique leads to the community's ability to transition individual "Not in My Back Yard" stances into a "Not in Our Back Yard" movement. This led to communal bargaining with developers. For Block Island, the result was a change to citizen's approval of developer's installation of a fiber optic cable connection to the mainland (Gibbons, p.1480). The communal pressure of the Block Island people was demonstrated through the published letters, but also at public hearings. The shared beliefs about the island and intercommunity worry for the economic concerns of neighbors brought a united front to the collaboration process.

Conclusion

While some scholars believe that NIMBY oriented perceptions are too simplistic, this analysis argues that NIMBY beliefs are valid and must be given attention by those in power. By studying the letters to the editor in the Block Island Times, the multi-leveled reasoning behind these opinions was identified. The letters show a side of the wind farm's development that public polls could not. Citizens were able to explain their reasoning and grow a community movement of opposition. This united voice began a productive collaboration between the island's elected officials and the wind farm developers.

This analysis demonstrates the use of combining public letters with public polls for researchers who seek to tap into community sentiment in times of controversy. The use of public letters, even in the age of technology, should not be overlooked by anyone looking to piece together a public voice from the past. Further research into the role of online community forums in developing community consensus may reveal even stronger movements and previous formations of attitudes.

This analysis illustrates reasoning for the existence of NIMBY in a positive, albeit uncommon, light. The citizens of Block Island voiced individual, self-centered and subjective reasoning against the wind farm. Though these attitudes are NIMBY in nature, this analysis finds that the people of the Block Island were entitled to them. In a broader context, this analysis also contributes to the theory that all individuals are righteous in their expression of NIMBY attitudes. The effects on the place, as well as the personal impacts, generate emotional responses. The work on Block Island shows that by tuning into these responses, developers can better understand a given public. This understanding led to useful dialogues and more appropriate compromises in Block Island. Future RET projects should look at this case as an example of productive collaboration of public and private groups.

Future developers should look to public letters in order to better understand the perceptions of local residents. This practice can potentially lead to better approaches to NIMBY categorized opposition.

As RETs continue to be built, a more informed and sensitized understanding of community can assist future developers. For citizens of a community that faces development, the use of public forums and letters to garner political support can create agency for individuals. These finds are integral as the world seeks alternative energysources.

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Materialization of Secession: The Case of Thailand

ABSTRACT: The existence of a minority population is common in most countries, however, the Malay-Muslim population in the Southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat has transcended the boundaries of a regular minority by dividing into violent insurgent groups. As research shows, this is largely attributed to Thailand's lack of acceptance and integration of the three provinces into Thai culture over the past one-hundred years. With ongoing calls for autonomy, the following study will explore the conditions in which secession may transpire in a country, which may explain why Bangkok has not conceded land to the Malay-Muslim insurgents.

KEYWORDS: Thailand, majority-minority power relations, secession, international legitimacy, domestic legitimacy

For the majority of Thai citizens, the passing of King Bhumibol Adulyadej was met with confusion and grief; however, there exists a minority population in the South that may have felt differently. For centuries, the Malay-Muslim minority of Southern Thailand has felt alienated and oppressed by the Thai government due to a lack of representation and equal opportunity as compared to the Thai-Buddhist majority. More recently, insurgent groups have called upon the Thai government to grant the Southern region autonomy in the form of secession, yet each attempt fails. As a result, tensions have grown at a staggering rate while insurgents acquire more advanced technology to inflict violence and fear upon citizens in the South and, occasionally, the North.

Malay-Muslim insurgents may see the passing of King Bhumibol Adulyadej as a metaphor for hope, but I argue that no amount of hope will ever lead the insurgents to their goal of successful secession. This is because the violence ensued by the majority-minority power competition has not exceeded high enough levels to grasp the attention of foreign aid and, moreover, the Malay-Muslim insurgents do not have the domestic or international legitimacy that would allow them to develop as an autonomous state.

In the following study, I will review various cases in which successful secession transpired across countries with similar conditions to that of Thailand. More specifically, I will study violence as a result of majority-minority power competition, external intervention as a response to said violence, and the importance of both domestic and international legitimacy to gain independence. Overall, I hope to use the variables found in the case studies to propose an explanation as to why the Southern provinces of Thailand have not been given land and, furthermore, if research offers any insight into whether there exists a future possibility of secession.

To begin, it is important to understand the qualities of a national minority. Minority differences are often socially and politically constructed rather than primordially constructed. For example, the minority population in South Sudan became known as such only after the North Sudanese majority adopted Arabic language, culture, and Islamic religion in the mid-twentieth century. Conversely, the Southern regions preserved the British-influenced English language, Christianity, and a hybrid of African and Western culture. That being said, the Northern Sudanese and Southern Sudanese ethnicities were the exact same.

Why, then, do minority and majority groups participate in intergroup conflict? According to political researcher Ted Gurr, the manifestation of intergroup conflict can best be explained by the Relative Deprivation

Theory. In short, the theory states that tensions arise if the minority group feels their position in the nation's social hierarchy falls far below that of the national majority, thus creating an asymmetrical social or power complex in which the minority holds significantly less civil liberties. Looking back at the violence that erupted in Sudan, Gurr's explanation of social and political asymmetry is fully evident. The Northern Sudanese, who affiliated themselves with Islamic practice and Arab culture, were favored through government policies that called for Arab ideology and language to preside over the entire country. The result was a nation that considered Arab speakers to be high-status and powerful, while non-Arab speakers were considered weak and backwards.

Moreover, tensions escalate into violence and/or attempted secession if the nation does not confront the social and political asymmetry. This was evident in Serbia when the Kosovar Albanians, the national minority, called for secession. The group argued that their civil liberties were so heavily infringed upon through state-run ethnic cleansing that it should be seen as a national violation of human rights. Indeed, research proves that high rates of suffocation, or the forced combination of two political cultures, lead to civil war and violence, while high rates of dismemberment, or the separation of preexisting political groups, lead to secession attempts. In many cases, such as that of Kosovo, suffocation and dismemberment happen sequentially as weak groups are continually divided and redistributed. This may also explain why patterns of violence are often followed by attempted secession.

Unfortunately, social and political asymmetry do not directly result in the actual act of secession for two different reasons. First, due to such an uneven balance in power, minority groups usually do not have the structural requirements to form the much-needed organization and unity that it would take to stand up to the majority. Second, even if the minority group does have adequate unity, the majority group (with support of the central government) still has enough authority to prohibit any attempts of secession.

In this instance, we see a substantial escalation of violence and displacement as the minority group rebels act out forcefully. The rate of violent attacks increases as minority and majority groups repeatedly attempt to retaliate against each other. Due to progressive involvement from either side, a domino effect forms in which violence spreads to previously unaffected regions.

When it becomes evident that neither side will accept failure and the use of force substantially escalates, the international community will intervene. Those who intervene often support the perceived victim. In order to make such a distinction, the UN Security Council published a list of criteria that a region must meet to qualify for intervention. Among the criteria, the council states there must exist "extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale," "no practicable alternative to the use of [intervention] if lives are to be saved," and that "the proposed use of force is necessary and proportionate to the aim (the relief of humanitarian need) and is strictly limited in time and scope to this aim—i.e. it is the minimum necessary to achieve that end".

In cases of moderate to high rates of successful intervention, it seems the involved organizations must be predominantly Western due to the West's extensive budget. This argument is supported by NATO's successful bombing campaign in Kosovo, in which 85% of funding came directly from the United States.

Another example of Western intervention used to successfully prime the secession of a country occurred in East Timor. The UN quickly intervened when tensions between the East Timor minority and the Indonesian majority resulted in significant levels of violence and displacement, including the attempted assassination of then president Jose Ramos Horta. As tensions grew, the UN called for increased support from the International Committee of the Red Cross, World Vision International and Medecins Sans Frontieres. The combination of the UN's policy suggestions and the healthcare provided by Western programs ultimately led to the restabilization of East Timor. Thus, the case of East Timor promotes a second argument in which Western aid is essential to successful intervention due to their large network of interconnected aid programs, such as healthcare and education. East Timor and Kosovo benefitted from these factors; however, the stability of the countries going forward is still to be determined.

Indeed, Western aid may provide the stability needed for a territory to secede, but the new country may only maintain its independence if it achieves both domestic and international legitimacy. Domestic legitima-

cy occurs when the host nation acknowledges and accepts the independence of the seceded territory. This is important because it prevents ongoing intergroup violence in which the host state, or majority, continuously attempts to assert authority over the seceded territory. International legitimacy occurs when the international community recognizes a country's successful secession from the host state. The community will often incorporate the new country into multinational organizations such as the United Nations, or offer to help establish a shared currency between the new country and neighboring countries. This form of legitimacy is crucial to the success of a seceded territory because it guarantees the protection of allied nations, and also provides a sense of financial security.

There are many legitimacy may be achieved, and the order of domestic or international recognition often varies with each case. For example, Croatia gained international legitimacy before domestic, because its host state, former Yugoslavia, refused to acknowledge its independence. In this case, the international community had an incentive to aid Croatia since it represented a step towards the fall of Communist Yugoslavia. For this reason, the United Nations Security Council published Resolution 713, which initiated the international recognition of secessionist movements in former Yugoslavia and established an arms embargo throughout all pertaining territories. Domestic legitimacy was eventually gained following ongoing violence throughout the first half of the 1990s. The example of successful secession in Croatia, thus, supports the argument that among new nation's, domestic legitimacy may be more important than international legitimacy. Ultimately, secession cannot transpire in any given territory if the host nation continues to suppress its development.

In order to achieve precise results, I will use the fact that the Thai government may be an oppressive force that denies any chance of Southern autonomy as a control. I control this by noting how Thai officials offered peace talks to the insurgents in the past as a way to achieve a diplomatic solution to the insurgency.

In my paper, the dependent variable is successful secession. Here, I define secession as the process of a territory declaring autonomy and then acting upon it. My first independent variable (IV) is majority-minority relations and power competition. My second IV is the intervention of Western organizations. My third IV is domestic and international legitimacy. The following analysis is based on a theoretical question, as the Southern Malay-Muslim provinces have not successfully seceded, and there exists no definitive reason to explain why not. With that being noted, I still assert that the findings of my research will hold value because they are tested against patterns of secessionist movements in conditions fairly similar to that of Thailand. It should also be specified that I am not advocating for an increase in violence or displacement in Thailand. This paper only serves as an analysis to explain why Thai insurgents have not been able to successfully secede and, further, what conditions must be present for secession to occur.

In the past couple decades, Thai majority-minority relations have become more tense and power competition more pronounced. Among the many factors that play a role in this, perhaps the most prominent is the asymmetrical power balance and representation faced by the Malay-Muslim minorities of the South. In fact, since the three Southern provinces were occupied by the Thai government in 1910, the host state has done little to integrate Malay-Muslim culture into Thai-Buddhist culture, and in many cases, has forced Thai culture, language, and Buddhist religion onto the minority. Although it has since changed, the 1920 Compulsory Primary Education Act required all children—including Malay-Muslim children—to attend schools taught all in the Thai language and adopt the Buddhist religion. Additionally, in the 1940s the Thai government under Plaek Phibulsongkram enforced the use of the Thai language among all citizens of the country and outlawed the use of regional dialects. While some policies have since changed, the strict enforcement was, for decades, a direct assault against Malay-Muslim values and culture. At that time, the minority took action. A series of uprisings and protests took place in the following decades that called for Malay-Muslim linguistic and cultural recognition, as well as greater representation within the government.

In 1976, Thailand's largest protest transpired during which tens of thousands of minority citizens staged a 47-day sit-in outside a mosque in Pattani. The Thai government briefly admitted to its shortcomings by establishing the Hearts and Minds policy that pledged to accept and better represent Malay-Muslim culture. Unfortu-

nately, the policy was ended twenty years later in 2002 under Prime Minister Thaksin.

Just before 2002, a survey found that about 30% of the Southern population was illiterate and a staggering 70% of Muslims never exceeded a primary school education. Furthermore, the majority of Malay-Muslims do not speak Thai, limiting any opportunity to study in well-funded schools, or find employment beyond the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. It is clear that contemporary social and political asymmetry exists, in which the Malay-Muslim population suffers the negative consequences, but it is important to also note that social and political asymmetry do not directly lead to the formation of secession. This is because of the very nature of minority-majority power competition, in which insurgents lack the needed structural requirements to form a clear secessionist movement. As a result, violence and displacement ensue.

In 1948, a protest in the Narathiwat province became violent, killing hundreds of citizens, in comparison to the 30 security forces. The escalation of violence resulted in the deployment of soldiers, police, and paramilitary to insurgent areas in Southern Thailand; however, use of force only further radicalized the insurgent. In 2015, the IRIN reported a total of 3,000-9,000 insurgents in the South and 150,000 soldiers, police, and paramilitary deployed to monitor rebel activity. The response has been an escalation in extreme methods of violence, such as IED bombings and machete hackings.

A study led by the International Displacement Monitoring Centre found that about 59% of the violence was targeted towards killing Muslims, while 38% was focused on killing Buddhists. Conversely, 61% of those injured by the violence are Buddhists, and 33% are Muslim. In this sense, it becomes clear that the target of most attacks are Buddhist civilians, because they represent the perceived oppressive majority. Due to the considerable increase of violence in 2005, both Buddhist and Malay-Muslim civilians began to emigrate from the three unstable Southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. In fact, since 2004, 30-50% of Buddhist civilians and 10-20% of Malay-Muslims left their homes to seek a safer community. It is therefore evident that the increased violence has led to the displacement of Buddhist and Muslim civilians alike.

While such data is troubling and certainly does not reflect a stable society, it also does not necessarily point towards the possibility of secession. Common trends leading up to successful secession often include violence and displacement far beyond 100,000 people. Displacement in Thailand has indeed reached high numbers, however, the country only experiences 50-100 casualties per month, averaging around 600-1,200 per year. Intergroup violence does in Thailand, but the data presented simply cannot compare to higher levels faced in countries such as Kosovo or South Sudan.

As studies of successful secession indicate, once intergroup violence and displacement reach dangerously high levels, a third-party must intervene to reinstate stability and order. It is common for the third-party to be a Western international organization such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is because Western organizations have a large budget that allows for the proper implementation of policy and aid. The lack of foreign intervention seems to be one of the most important indicators as to why the Southern areas of Thailand have not seceded.

According to the IMF, Thailand has not been a recipient of foreign intervention since 2002, because it was able to pay back debts acquired during the 1997-1998 economic crisis and has also recently shown an increase in GDP. This is not to say that intervention improved conditions in the Southern provinces of Thailand before 2002. According to the Asia Foundation, foreign groups found it more useful to strengthen state structures because this offered relief to the country while sustaining a positive diplomatic relationship. Going past the central government to aid the Southern provinces made little sense because the insurgency only directly affected 2% of the Thai population.

The International Displacement Monitoring Centre provided a similar explanation for the lack of foreign intervention in conflicting areas of Southern Thailand. While violence may occur on a daily basis, the levels are too insignificant to signal the need for foreign involvement. Moreso, the international community is not directly affected by the insurgency in Thailand, as violence is generally limited to areas in the Southern Provinces. While the majority of resorts that attract foreign visitors are located South of Bangkok, they are still far from the three

Southern provinces. If foreigners were the target of insurgent group violence, or if the violence began to spread further North, the international community would have more reason to intervene.

The Malay-Muslim minority does not have enough power or structure to challenge the central government in Bangkok, let alone organize the stable society and political system needed for an autonomous state. The help of foreign aid could provide the minority with enough stability to do so, but as data shows, foreign actors are not willing to intervene in the Thai insurgency. Without intervention, the chances of a successful secession in the South of Thailand continue to be unlikely.

The third trend found among countries that held a successful secession is the existence of both domestic and international legitimacy. It is clear that the Thai central government is aware of the insurgent groups in the South since they have called for peace talks within the past few decades. These talks, however, generally do not result in negotiation for two key reasons. First, Thai government agencies historically do a poor job of contacting insurgent leaders; and second, insurgent leaders are hesitant to meet with these agencies. Such hesitancy may seem rather counterintuitive. One would expect insurgents to be eager to negotiate autonomy if given the opportunity, but as history has countlessly reiterated, the Thai government is unpredictable. Insurgents fear that peace talks could be a ploy for Thai officials to collect their identities and later assassinate them. These reasons explain why there has been a continuation of unresolved conflict and ongoing power competition.

Proving international legitimacy is even more complicated. If a territory already seceded, its legitimacy would be measured by observing which organizations included the new country; however, this is not the case in Thailand. Under these circumstances, one must measure international legitimacy of the Thai insurgency by examining the relationship between Thailand and international organizations as well as how such organizations have reacted to the insurgency.

To begin with, the country of Thailand is part of many organizations including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. This is relevant because it signifies that all the nations within those establishments have already acknowledged the legitimacy of Thailand as a country. Conversely, if any of the international organizations listed were to outwardly support the Thai insurgency, they would undermine the legitimacy of Thailand and potentially cut all diplomatic relations with the nations involved. This explains why organizations such as the UN have not publically recognized the need for autonomy in the deep South, often remaining silent in response to reports of violence or human rights abuses. On the other hand, beyond Western organizations, Asian organizations be the first to acknowledge the legitimacy of Thailand's Malay-Muslim insurgency. Unfortunately, the largest group, ASEAN, is also unlikely to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Thai insurgency because Thailand was one of the countries who pioneered and helped develop the organization. Similar to the discussion of domestic legitimacy, it appears that international legitimacy is also unlikely in the case of Thailand.

This data makes it clear that all three variables measured pertaining to secession in Southern Thailand point to a continuation of central Thai power. Intergroup tensions are undoubtedly high; however, violence has not reached a high enough level for the international community to intervene. It is also important to note Thailand has close relations with both ASEAN and the UN. This indicates the improbability that foreign aid would support such a small insurgency, consequently risking the loss of a global partner. It is also evident that Thai officials are aware of the insurgency but ultimately unwilling to cooperate or take insurgent claims seriously.

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PHOTO CREDIT: Sonja Wolke

Henry Liebers

The Homosexual “In Tent”: The Complexity of the Boy Scouts of America’s Ban on Gay Members

ABSTRACT: The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) have had a long and complex history with discrimination. Surprisingly, not all of these problems exist in the distant past for the organization. Until 2014, the BSA actively banned membership of homosexual members, leaders and volunteers. The inclusion of homosexuals was originally thought to conflict with the purpose of the organization: to increase and promote masculinity. This ban was kept under the radar until an assistant scoutmaster, James Dale, was kicked out after he came out as gay. The court case that ensued insured that the BSA’s homophobic tendencies were no longer kept secret, and, as a result, they lost many of their biggest donors and experienced a decrease in new participants. Although this ban has since been repealed, that does not guarantee that homophobia does not occur at the individual troop level, and, in fact, interviews with former participants indicate that this is exactly the case.

KEYWORDS: Boy Scouts of America (BSA), homosexuality, homophobia, discrimination

Introduction

There are few century-old organizations in the United States that can claim to have reversed their positions as radically as the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). Until 2014, The BSA held policies that actively banned membership of homosexuals both as youth scouts and as adult leaders and volunteers. In their long history, the organization has seen many societal changes. The BSA was founded by William D. Boyce in 1910, three years after Lord Baden-Powell invented the concept of Boy Scouting itself in England. Throughout its existence, the BSA has proven to be a very influential organization, but until recently has not been accommodating to people of all sexual orientations. There are several problems with this lack of acceptance, including the possibility that Lord Baden-Powell himself was gay. In examining this complicated issue, it is important to understand that the Boy Scouts were founded during what were then considered very turbulent times for men and masculinity. This paper will examine the history behind the BSA’s ban on homosexuals, the possible reasons for removing the ban after more than one-hundred years, and the discrepancies between the attitudes toward homosexual membership at the national level and at the troop level. I hope to illustrate that the BSA is an organization which is continuously evolving, and that the National Leadership of the BSA is not necessarily representative of members.

History of the BSA

The scouting movement began in England in 1907, when Lord Robert Stephenson Smyth Baden-Powell published his book *Scouting for Boys*. The book grew out of the idea that urbanization and increased immigration in the UK was making boys “soft,” a view that was widely expressed at that time (Coleman et al. 153). A movement was needed to create “tough” youth capable of defending the British race and empire from threats like racial and gender equality in Britain and in British colonies (Arneil 54). The English Scout Association was born

out of two anxieties in the first years of the twentieth century: a potential loss of national strength and masculinity, and the loss of imperial and racial superiority (Arneil 54). It is important to remember that at the time the Boy Scouts became an organization in England, the women’s suffrage movement was also beginning. This would have further created a crisis of masculinity that led to the creation of programs meant to increase and promote masculinity. Thus, the global scouting movement was also born out of male paranoia over a perceived loss of power and masculinity. Ironically, Baden-Powell is often rumored to have been a repressed homosexual based on his obsessions with schoolmates as a child (Jeal 30), male characters like Peter Pan (Jeal 30), and his apparent fixation with anal and rectal cleanliness as outlined in the first edition of his book *Scouting for Boys* (Boehmer 301-308). However, Boehmer acknowledges that in most cases, the sexuality of historical figures can never be firmly established nor refuted (303), and Baden-Powell’s sexuality, while it may be interesting, is not the most significant part of the discussion of homosexual participation in the Boy Scouts.

The Boy Scouts first appeared in the United States in 1910 when William D. Boyce brought the movement over from England. Growing urbanization, immigration, and the momentum of the first wave of feminism became a perfect environment for adopting a program based on male anxieties. In addition to these perceived issues, the “loss” of America’s western frontier exhausted the need for “manly men” to explore and chart it, ultimately providing more justification for the idea that there was a danger of boys becoming soft (Arneil, 55). The main differences between the English Boy Scout program and the BSA had to do with the emphases in their respective oaths. While the British scouts heavily emphasized obedience in their oath, the BSA employed a clause which addresses morality. England was a nation obediently devoted to their monarch while the United States was a nation born of revolting from said obedience. This illustrates a significant difference in the focus of the respective programs. The BSA took much of their inspiration from Native Americans because of their independence and perceived morality (Arneil 55), while the English emphasized the idea of dutifully serving a leader. The original English oath specifically mentions serving “God and King.” In the US, “morally straight” is often interpreted as meaning “sexually straight,” therefore implying that to be anything other than heterosexual is to be immoral. While not specifically condemning homosexuality, the fact that contrasting interpretations of these words exist shows that the policy on homosexual membership is, in some ways, ambiguous and downplayed in the BSA’s literature.

The Current Situation

People first became truly aware of the BSA’s discriminatory policy towards gays with the Dale vs. Boy Scouts of America Supreme Court case in 2000, which centered around James Dale, a former scout whose membership and position as assistant scoutmaster were revoked after he came out as gay. Dale sued for membership, and although he won in the New Jersey supreme court, the US Supreme court decided in a 5-4 vote that forcing the Boy Scouts to admit homosexual members would violate their constitutional rights as a private organization and would violate their rights of freedom of association (Koppelman and Wolff x). Until this case, the ban on gays was not well recognized. It was not widely known that the BSA held these restrictions in regards to member sexuality, and those who did know about it didn’t believe the Boy Scouts would terminate membership over it. Koppelman and Wolff outline the aftermath of the case, citing that many of the BSA’s biggest donors and sponsors severed ties to the organization following the ruling, including CVS, American Airlines, and Levi Strauss (81-82). The BSA then doubled down on their position, terminating the membership of homosexuals and those who spoke out against the ban, and removing the charters of any troop that allowed homosexual participation (Mechling, 210). This shows that the BSA was, at that time, focused on maintaining a masculine image, but it also suggests that the bureaucratic “official” BSA is not the same as the membership demographic, what Mechling calls the “real” Boy Scouts (214). Because the ban is essentially discrimination, many public schools banned the BSA from holding meetings and recruiting scouts on their property. This was so devastating that the BSA had to seek congressional support for their dwindling organization (Koppelman and Wolff, 82).

On January 1, 2014, the BSA announced that they would officially accept gay youth and allow them to

join the BSA. In the formal statement by the Boy Scouts, which abolished the ban on gay membership, the BSA adopted the following position:

“WHEREAS, Scouting is a youth program, and any sexual conduct, whether homosexual or heterosexual, by youth of Scouting age is contrary to the virtues of Scouting...” (Membership Standards Resolution, 2014).

Rather than form a real position on sexual orientation in scouting, the BSA simply stated that sexuality of any kind should not be tolerated in the Scouts. While this may seem a logical solution to the issue at hand, merely denying sexuality of any kind can be damaging to young children who, as the resolution later states, are still developing physically and emotionally, and who still have not fully realized their senses of right and wrong (Membership Standards Resolution 2014). This policy towards homosexuals, while no longer explicitly discriminatory, continues to cause harm to developing youths by discouraging sexuality in general rather than promoting tolerance of differing sexual orientations. It is also problematic that the BSA has instituted a policy where individual units or troops can decide whether to allow gay youth or adults to participate, essentially allowing discrimination at each individual troops’ discretion.

The BSA and Homophobia

Ayres and Brown outline extensively that initial reactions to any sort of upset in a community tend to be very defensive. In this case, the BSA largely blamed those who wanted the ban overturned, and accused them of trying to undermine their sense of morality and reverence. The BSA desperately tried to defend their actions and policies, but ultimately continued to lose membership because of their defensive tactics in dealing with the issue. To join or associate oneself with an organization, like the Boy Scouts, is to adopt their principles and serve as a representative of those views and values. In this case, anyone who joined the Boy Scouts or enrolled their children in the Boy Scouts was (until 2014) openly associating themselves with a group that discriminated against homosexuals (Ayres and Brown, Part 3). The BSA was a discriminatory organization for a long time but shame can be a very effective weapon. Fourteen years after the Dale vs. The Boy Scouts of America, shame helped to change the stance of the Boy Scouts of America from a biased one to a neutral one.

One noteworthy trait of the BSA is that, while they maintained this hidden homophobic policy for so many years, their existence is based around the principle of males choosing to fraternize exclusively with other males. This is not to say that homosocial relations automatically insinuate homosexual relations, but in the context of the BSA, the hypocrisy is rather striking. As Coleman et al. describes in “Scout’s Honor,” the Boy Scouts are an organization which meets in a private setting, teaching participants what it means to be men, and where young boys “come of age” in a way which is informed largely by mythical images of “manly men” (167).

The BSA is a deeply nationalistic organization, so when analyzing its structure, it is important to acknowledge that it employs both mythical images of the ideal male and images of a strong nation. Coleman et al. argues that this is a form of “sexual citizenship” wherein the male body is associated with American society’s need for order and progress, in addition to self-control (155). It is important to note the presence of certain homoerotic and nationalistic elements of the Boy Scouts and their points of intersection given that the BSA is an organization whose roots lie in a response to crises of masculinity whereby males associate solely with other males. A male-exclusive organization which boasts a history of more than a century cannot easily claim to have never housed any homoerotic contact. There are many homoerotic elements in the story of the BSA and the main reason for its longtime ban of homosexual members was simply to downplay the already easily recognizable homoerotic symbolism that characterizes its existence. What is also significant is the general root cause of the homophobia, which is the defensive denial of its existence. Homophobic denial stems mainly from certain people’s need to maintain their own perceived image in the eyes of the public (Coleman et al. 167). Homosexuals are often considered to be effeminate and un-manly, so it stands to reason that the BSA excluded homosexuals to prove that they are masculine and not “soft,” as Lord Baden-Powell so eloquently put it.

From these topics, ranging from the origins of the BSA and the heavy emphasis of masculinity put on

boys to the response to protest about homosexual discrimination, it is clear that the BSA is an institution that has had a very complex relationship with its members. While it continues to have a wide range of influence, and membership is growing throughout the United States, it is still important to note that the Boy Scouts at the local level and the Boy Scouts at the national bureaucratic level don’t necessarily harbor the same views.

Methods

This study examines the complex relationship between the BSA and homosexuals and asks: (1) what is the historical context that has allowed the Boy Scouts to continue to exclude anyone not identifying as a heterosexual male from joining, and (2) what are current attitudes toward homosexuality in the Boy Scouts and are they changing?

As a longtime member of the Boy Scouts, I have always been annoyed by the idea that anyone who happens to be gay would not be allowed to share in the wonderful memories I made as a scout, simply because he was not attracted to the “correct” gender. I have watched friends leave the scouts because they were gay, or simply because they didn’t want to support an organization which excluded such a large population of people. I can’t hope to be objective in this study given my obvious support for LGBTQ rights, understanding is a virtue which I continuously strive to achieve. To make change, one must first acknowledge and understand the opposition to that change, and understand how the beginnings of policies relate to modern day justifications of said policies.

With the historical context of homosexuality in the Boy Scouts, I hope to present the following interviews in a way which highlights the way the BSA deals with homosexuality, the culture that exists within individual troops, the justifications for the policies that exist in the BSA, and what is likely to happen in the future for the BSA regarding inclusivity and openness to LGBT youth.

After conducting my historical research about the Boy Scouts and their policies on gays throughout their century-long history, I used qualitative ethnographic interviews to gauge the feelings of those who are, or were, directly affected by the ban. These interviews focused on personal beliefs of the individual and the ways their beliefs interact with the policies of the BSA. Generally, I asked very open-ended question about the BSA or their policy on homosexual membership, and I let the interviewee branch out as much as possible. This allowed the interviewee to express his thoughts on the subject in a way that made sense to him. Because of the need to remain informal and objective, I used ethnographic interviews from Lindlhof and Taylor’s model (176). I then synthesize from my interviews a paper which outlines how the different attitudes of the Boy Scouts and those related to the Boy Scouts are connected, and where they differ. Using both historical research and ethnographic interviews, I gained an understanding of how modern attitudes towards these policies are changing the face of the BSA.

Analysis: Interviews

I reached out to several people to be interviewed for this project, and received five responses. Four people agreed to be a part of the project while one person declined. The fifth person who I asked for an interview declined because they hold a position as a paid employee of the BSA. All the names of interviewees in this paper are aliases.

The first person I interviewed was a former scout named Daniel who left the Boy Scouts after having been involved for seven years, beginning as a Cub Scout. His main reason for leaving was a “huge change in atmosphere between Cub Scouts (an entry level scouting program for boys in elementary school) and Boy Scouts.” As Daniel put it, Boy Scouts differed from Cub Scouts in that it “felt like it was less about having fun and more of a competition over who could be the best at outdoor stuff.” Rather than a program that encouraged camaraderie, he felt that the Boy Scouts harbored a more “every man for himself” type of philosophy. Americans in general have a great love of independence and a respect for those who think and act independently. Since the BSA is such a nationalistic organization, this love of independence had an integral role in the formation of the BSA. Their idea of raising young men to be strong and moral implies a sense of masculine independence. Daniel’s view was that this focus on independence was not conducive to a strong organization and that individuality at the expense of an enjoyable learning environment went against his ideal Boy Scout program.

Regarding the ban on homosexuality, Daniel says he wasn't aware of it until around the time he left Scouting. However, he pointed out that homosexuality was generally frowned upon in his experience with the Boy Scouts:

“The fact that, while in the Scouts I was often bullied by being called gay by fellow scouts was really off-putting... To make matters worse, there didn't seem to be any active effort by the leaders to combat that.”

Daniel's experience with the BSA involved boys who bullied those who did not conform to their own idea of masculinity, and adults who did very little to combat that type of abuse. To look at the BSA through Daniel's eyes is to see an organization that allows bullying and does little to encourage fostering friendship. Using “gay” as a derogative usually amounts to calling men or boys soft, weak, or too feminine. With this context for the word, it is easy to understand why its use as an insult is present in the BSA, given the historical context of the organization's founding.

The use of the word “gay” as a means of bullying is evidence that the BSA is more focused on “toughening men up” than on creating a positive environment. As outlined by Ayres and Brown, responses to forwarding homosexual rights tend to yield defensive reactions from heterosexual groups (Part 3). The BSA does little to lessen bullying based on sexual orientation at the local level. Boys often use “gay” as a derogative both to encourage their peers to adhere to a certain set of characteristics, and to drive away those who would not fit their dictionary definition of “tough.” In Daniel's case, the word was used because he didn't fit their views of how men should act. Interestingly, Daniel was the only person I spoke to who specifically cited anti-gay bullying as a major defining factor of his experience with the Boy Scouts. This culture of using the word “gay” as a derogatory term is not exclusive to the BSA, but the fact that it exists in the BSA is indicative of the organization's failure to create a wholly inclusive and safe environment for boys, even if it does exist on such a small scale.

My second interviewee had a different experience. Randal is an Eagle Scout who left the BSA at age 15 simply because he felt he had gotten everything he could out of the organization. His troop was not chartered to a religious organization and the climate was generally apolitical. Like Daniel, Randal expressed that for most of his scouting experience, he didn't know about the BSA's policy towards gay youth and adults, and when he did find out, it was a something of a shock. “It seemed very exclusive for such a progressive time period. It didn't make a lot of sense to me.” Randal did mention an experience he had with someone who opposed lifting the ban. He said,

“One of [my] neighbors had younger kids in scouts and he expressed frustrations about ‘overcompensating’ for the new allowance of homosexuality. Their bandanas were pink at summer camp that year, which he thought was overcompensating.”

Randal's neighbor, in this case, was offended not by the fact that the BSA had chosen to begin allowing homosexuals to join, but by the fact that they are “overcompensating” for that change. It concerned him that his boys were being forced to wear pink on their uniforms because pink is often associated with femininity. While heterosexual people may support equal rights for homosexuals, they also often feel uncomfortable when homosexuality becomes more visible in a society. In this instance, Randal's neighbor (a father) disliked the idea that his children were issued pink kerchiefs for their uniforms, a stereotypically “gay” color. However, it is important to note that homosexuals are often pressured to exhibit stereotypically heterosexual traits just to be taken seriously. The idea that this father was offended that his sons had to wear pink is a very clear illustration of heterosexual privilege. While this father may be offended at color schemes being too “gay,” plenty of scouts like Daniel would have been more offended by the outright discriminatory policies the BSA practiced. The use of the word gay as a derogative is offensive both to gay people and to anyone who supports gay rights; therefore it is clear that this father's outrage is misdirected. Rather than being angry that his sons were forced to wear pink, it would be more productive to criticize the culture that assigns colors to genders and sexual orientations. This misdirected grievance illustrates that individuals like this father are more concerned with their own hyper-masculine image than with inclusivity. Simply acknowledging the existence of homosexuality via the pink bandanas felt like a threat to this father. This shows that, in some circles, defending and disciplining masculinity is a higher

priority than acknowledging “the other.”

My third interview was a BSA volunteer who works as a district commissioner in the Northern Lights District (Longhouse Council) in the State of New York. His combined experience with the BSA both as a scout and an adult volunteer adds up to about thirty-five years of involvement. Rather than being a discriminatory organization, Richard says that the BSA is actually a program which is constantly evolving and making changes for the better. When asked if the Boy Scouts could ever get past their historical reputation for discrimination against gays, he explained, “If it wants to survive, any organization needs to be open to change. If not, they're dead because society changes.” He continued:

“Would yesterday's 1910 version of the BSA fly today? Probably not, but I think as we change individually and as a society, organizations like scouting change, too. And we can see that happening with getting rid of this ban.”

Richard's view of the Boy Scouts seemed to be far more optimistic than critical. He felt the ban was “stupid and reactionary,” and that the BSA lifting the ban is a step in the right direction. He related it back to his own experience in 1988 when the Boy Scouts first started allowing women to become scoutmasters in Boy Scout troops. He stated:

“It was interesting to see the reactions of people that I respected and thought were really good scouters and adults I looked up to. Some of them said, ‘Hey, this is a really good idea, we're going to get some help,’ some disagreed. The reason the Boy Scouts did it was for the survival of the program. At a time when the divorce rate was above fifty percent, who do the kids stay with? They stay with mom.”

Up until 1988, women were only allowed to lead Cub Scout dens, not Boy Scout troops. His attitude, as a district commissioner, is always in favor of allowing more potential for adult participation. He said, “You can always get kids to join. That's never been a problem. The biggest problem right now is just getting adult volunteers.” The BSA has, over time, evolved to make their programming more inclusive of others; however, Richard is implying that the main reason the Boy Scouts have adopted more inclusive policies is to keep the organization afloat, not because it is morally right. However, Richard's own approach to the situation appears to be based on a combination of his morals and practicality. “I don't discriminate and I'm not going to start. I'd rather have two fathers or two mothers participate and be positive than have a bunch of parents who can't or won't participate.” While he acknowledges that lifting the ban allowed for more potential adult volunteers, he also cites that it is against his personal morals to discriminate in general. Richard's view of the ban is based largely on the idea that the program must evolve if it is to survive. Since he wants it to survive, he has adopted the view that the BSA should have a policy of inclusivity.

The final interview I conducted was with a twenty-nine-year veteran of the Boy Scouts named Arthur. Arthur explained that he only joined the Boy Scouts as an adult volunteer, and he was never a scout himself. He said:

“When I first joined, there was nothing in the paperwork or the promises or anything that mentioned that they were antigay so I didn't know that, or I wouldn't have joined for that reason. And I always regretted along the way that I had agreed to join before I had known all the facts.”

Even though Arthur enjoyed being a part of the BSA enough to continue for twenty-nine years, he does say that he has had reservations about being part of an organization which discriminates so heavily. His general philosophy on the matter is that the only way to make change is to stay involved, because had he resigned, the BSA would not listen to his opinion. The most difficult situation Arthur mentioned was when a scout with two mothers (he was adopted by a lesbian couple) joined the troop. Arthur said he found it difficult because he knew his membership would be revoked if he allowed these women to join the troop, but he also felt morally obligated to allow them to join as adult volunteers. This shows that while he may have felt obligated to allow them to join the troop that would have been against the policy of the BSA, he felt it would be safer to voice concerns verbally in discussions over low levels of recruitment in his council. When asked if he had ever encountered any homophobia amongst boys in his troop, Arthur said, “I don't know a single kid who's antigay. They're used to it and

know it isn't a threat." Arthur's experience with the BSA, similarly to Richard's, was characterized by speaking out against the ban of homosexuals and experiencing little to no homophobia or antigay sentiment at the local level. This shows a divide between the experience of adult volunteers and scouts, since both of the former scouts I interviewed recounted experiences of antigay rhetoric or actions being committed on the troop level.

The people I spoke to generally housed two schools of thought. Arthur and Richard both viewed the lifting of the ban as a practical move for the BSA, but also praised it as a moral move forward. They acknowledged that the BSA has evolved heavily in its century of existence, and viewed the BSA as an organization that, if not open to such changes, would ultimately disappear. They did not, however, have any experiences in dealing with homophobia in their time volunteering and working with the BSA. The two former scouts I interviewed, Randal and Daniel, had differing views of the BSA. Daniel's view was almost entirely negative, citing the bullying he both witnessed and received as one of his reasons for leaving the Boy Scouts. Randal also pointed out that his neighbor, a father, was critical of the BSA for how they handled the change in policy, saying that having pink bandanas was "overcompensating." This points to a significant amount of homophobia or at least discomfort about the idea of homosexual participation at the local level.

It was striking to me that no one I spoke to, although they all came from very diverse areas, was against the inclusion of gays in the Boy Scouts. While I have always considered the BSA to be a very conservative organization, it seems that much of the scouting community feels that lifting the ban on gay participants was a step in the right direction for the organization, both from the practical view and from the moral view. The only negative reactions to lifting the ban that I encountered in this study were through Randal, who mentioned his neighbor's dismay at the BSA's "overcompensation." The rest of the interviewees had very positive attitudes toward lifting the ban and had not encountered many (if any) people who were dismayed about it. It is also worth noting that all four of the people I interviewed were not aware of the BSA's stance on homosexuality until well into their scouting experience, showing that the BSA did not necessarily want to be defined by their exclusion of homosexual members. This is clear evidence that the BSA's national policies do not necessarily represent the views of members.

Conclusion

The Boy Scouts of America is by no means a perfect organization, but for the most part, those who I spoke to who have been involved with it view it positively. The BSA is an organization that is continuously evolving. Until the 1970s, there was no policy preventing Boy Scout troops from segregating based on race, and until 1988, the BSA did not allow women to become Scoutmasters. Now, although the BSA has not prevented LGBTQ discrimination within the organization outright, it has made a step in the right direction. The BSA was late to take firm positions against racial discrimination and sex discrimination, and many would say they were late to renounce their ban on gays. From the words of these four interview subjects, it is apparent that homophobia is at least partially present in the BSA, but that the attitude in the organization is moving in a more inclusive direction. The testimonies of Arthur and Richard illustrate the official attitudes toward homosexuality and the reasons for lifting the ban on homosexuals. However, Daniel and Randal suggest that homophobia is present at the local level both with scouts and with parents of scouts. The inevitable conclusion is that homophobia is still present in the organization even with the lifting of the ban. The BSA's removal of the ban had moral support by many members, but the more likely reason for lifting the ban was to attract more members. The BSA is an old organization which must continuously evolve to survive. The decision to allow homosexual participation was more likely a product of the realization that societal shifts towards support of gay membership would be the downfall of organizations with antigay policies. This change will doubtlessly lead to more changes in the future as the organization evolves with an ever-changing society.

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Lauren Nolan

The Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism

ABSTRACT: High art has become incredibly expensive over time. There are many factors that go into determining the value of artwork. Often, art buyers establish value based on whether or not a work of art fulfills a narrative of authenticity, which means that a piece includes objective indicators that show how authentic it is. Although this narrative is important, the wealthy, who are able to purchase more expensive pieces of art, are the ones who really drive the market up. These well-off art buyers identify an “indefinable quality” in the pieces they purchase, yet they are not sure what this quality truly entails, so they continue to buy expensive high art to calm their own anxiety of not knowing. This aesthetic criticism creates a platform for elitist thinking and systematically distances from popular appeal, and everything the majority values and appreciates, thus reinforcing the elite’s control of the high art market.

KEYWORDS: elitism, narrative of authenticity, utility, aesthetic criticism

On November 12, 2014, Christie’s annual fall auction became the highest-grossing auction in history with sales totaling \$852.9 million dollars. In May 2015, Christie’s broke their own auction record again when Alberto Giacometti’s life-sized sculpture, *Pointing Man* sold for \$141.3 million dollars and Pablo Picasso’s *Les Femmes d’Alger* sold for \$179.4 million dollars. Why has art become so expensive? People generally value goods and services based on their utility or “usefulness,” but in the case of valuing artwork, utility is more subjective. When determining one piece of art’s usefulness in comparison to another, art buyers consider their individual tastes and preferences. These preferences are influenced by the art buyer’s desire for a narrative of authenticity, which means that buyers look for objective indicators that clearly point to the work’s authenticity. However, while the need for a narrative of authenticity plays a role in determining value, I argue that the wealthy’s perception of high art creates a platform for elitism and allows for systematic distancing from popular culture or anything else considered tacky or “tasteless.” Instead of admitting that this act of distancing exists, the elite tend to argue that their refined tastes and preferences are subjective and purely accidental. I argue that the wealthy’s denial creates a strange contrast surrounding whether determining value is based in subjective or objective art criticism. This paradox indicates that at their core, art buyers are frantically uncertain about what makes high art so valuable.

Economic Value

In *Pricing the Priceless*, William D. Grampp, discusses the theory of economic value pertaining to valuing works of art. When defining the worth of an artwork, Grampp highlights the theory of marginal utility, or the value of a good or service based on the utility it can yield—utility being defined as any kind of satisfaction the consumer experiences from that good or service. This means that an artwork’s utility is based on personal preferences that differ from person to person. Grampp further states,

The price represents the value of an object that provides something or other to those who pay it... What people do receive from the art they pay for is pleasure, pride, instruction, enlightenment, inspiration, or any other kind of utility as economists use the word, to mean a return of some kind or another.

While Grampp makes it clear that the value of art is determined by the utility it yields, the usefulness that causes consumers to demand one work over another is more ambiguous. While there are many ways that art achieves

utility for a buyer, I argue that there is a specific narrative of authenticity that governs how buyers determine value.

Utility and Narratives of Authenticity

Art buyers often desire artwork to be categorized by an authorial structure. Typically, a work of art becomes increasingly more valuable if completed by a famous artist. Michel Foucault describes the function of the author or artist’s name in “What is an Author?,” by stating, “It is more than a gesture, a finger pointed at someone; it is, to a certain extent, the equivalent of a description.” Foucault argues that a well-known name in the art world identifies more than just a person. A famous name represents the work the artist has completed, and fabricates a narrative of every stylistic movement they have either created or influenced. Over time, artists lose their individuality and come to be defined only by their work. I argue that one indication of a narrative of authenticity is whether the work satisfies an authorial structure. Therefore, buyers are more inclined to pay a higher price if a work is created by a famous artist.

The art buyer’s desire for a narrative of authenticity is exemplified when the Museum of Fine Arts in Dahlem, West Berlin, learned that the portrait of *The Man with the Golden Helmet* was not painted by Rembrandt. Because Rembrandt is considered one of the great masters of European art, *The Man with the Golden Helmet* fit neatly into an authorial structure and provided a clear narrative of authenticity. However, new information that the painting was actually painted by one of Rembrandt’s students resulted in a scandal. This lessened the importance of both the painting and its monetary value. The dis-attribution of Rembrandt’s work indicates that works of art require an authentic narrative. Buyers demand that the work must be indicative of the artist who made it, and failing to do so greatly reduces the value. Although *The Man with the Golden Helmet* was never physically altered, it is no longer considered to be one of the greatest masterpieces of all time because it was not painted by Rembrandt himself. This illustrates how buyers and collectors are more likely to value art more highly if the work neatly fits into a narrative of artistic genius and authenticity.

In addition, while buyers demand an authorial structure for a work to be valuable, they also require the artwork to be reminiscent of the particular artist’s time period and artist’s well-known stylistic movements. In “Art History’s Hegelian Unconscious: Naturalism as Nationalism in the Study of Early Netherlandish Painting,” Keith Moxey explains the Hegelian concept that art history has a teleological structure. This means that the organization of art history is based on moving toward a goal. Works of art auctioned at Christie’s and Sotheby’s are valued increasingly higher if their subject matter or stylistic quality built the foundation for a new style of art. For example, Moxey explains that Byzantine art eventually influenced a new and more progressive stylistic movement known as Realism. Moxey further explains that Byzantine art’s “value could be located in the way it constituted... a development that ultimately represented an advance toward the present...” This illustrates how art gains value if it serves as a testament to the many other artistic movements that it influenced later on in history. Because Byzantine art influenced a more progressive art form, it neatly fits into a historical structure and satisfies the buyer’s desire for a narrative of authenticity.

In addition, Moxey argues that because of art history’s teleological nature, art historians tend to analyze art based on the “spirit of the age” that existed when the work was completed. Moxey explains that “Poetry, music, court etiquette, and visual art are all said to share certain qualities which are related to an explanatory thesis that accounts for the period as a whole, as the spokes of a wheel are related to its hub.” Similar to the buyer’s desire for art to fit into an authorial structure, art is also deemed more valuable if the work of art fits into a stylistic structure. This means that a work is characteristic of an artist’s most well-known style. Similar to Moxey’s analogy of the spokes and the hub, the art’s most well-known style must be an explanatory thesis for the artist’s character and the period they painted in. In *Art as an Investment*, Richard H. Rush further supports this claim by arguing, “The value of a painting depends therefore, not only on who painted it, but on how characteristic the particular painting is of the artist, and the period in the artist’s career in which it was painted.” Rush asserts that art typically demands a higher price if it directly references a period in the artist’s life which art buyers have iden-

tified as the most characteristic of that particular artist. For example, during Paul Gauguin's lifetime he mainly painted in Paris and Tahiti, however, the paintings he completed in Tahiti are stylistically more unique than his other works. In contrast to his earlier French paintings, his Tahitian paintings are more exotic and colorful, and could hardly be mistaken for any other artist's work during that time. Eventually, Gauguin's Tahitian paintings came to be seen as precursors to an entire art movement later known as Fauvism. While Gauguin's French paintings were likely very skillfully done, art buyers do not consider them as valuable as his Tahitian paintings because they fail to satisfy the buyer's desire for a stylistic structure. Because the French paintings are not the most notable in Paul Gauguin's oeuvre, the narrative of authenticity is rendered incomplete.

Buyers make purchases based on the specific utility the art yields, and this utility is governed by whether or not an artwork satisfies a narrative of authenticity. This narrative is only complete if the work depicts an important message, or fits neatly into a stylistic or historical structure. When valuing art, buyers demand that these different structures are clearly represented in a work. If there is any question that the work of art does not coincide with its narrative of authenticity, the work is considered less valuable. However, while the buyer's desire for a clear narrative of authenticity indicates how buyers value art, it fails to explain why the art market has become so segregated and tremendously exclusive. To answer the question "why is high art becoming so exclusive," many newspaper articles argue that the exclusivity of the market is rooted in high art's rising prices. Because art has become a symbol of social status for wealthy elites, the art market has become increasingly more speculative, and as they continue to compete with one another, they effectively drive up the price of high art.

Art and Elitism

Georgina Adam expresses this widely held opinion in her article "Why is Art so Expensive?." She explains that because art now sells for upwards of \$100 million dollars at auction, it has become a market affordable to the rich and powerful alone. Adam further argues that art has increasingly become a speculative market because the wealthy elite are purchasing art at incredibly high prices. She explains that the source of speculation is perhaps connected to "The sheer amount of money in the hands of billionaires—and there are, at the last count according to Forbes, 1,426 of them spread throughout the world—to indulge in a highly competitive sport to bag the best artworks." Adam therefore believes that the competitive nature of the rich and powerful is ultimately driving the price of art through the roof. As a result, the high art market has become incredibly exclusive, reserved for the wealthy and powerful alone. While this may be true of high art, the vast majority of art continues to represent a wide variety styles and techniques that tend to be sold at a diverse range of prices. Despite this price variety, there seems to be a clear societal understanding of the type of art that is or isn't available to the general public. Even though the most obvious barrier to high art is its quickly rising price tag, I believe there are deeper, more substantial circumstances factoring into this societal phenomenon that essentially keeps the masses from participating. Although the rising prices do discourage the majority, I argue that the exclusive nature of the high art market is more likely explained by the wealthy elite's fundamental perception of high culture.

While Adam's argument clearly explains how high art is becoming a symbol of social status among the wealthy elite, she doesn't explain why they use art instead of any other object. She explains that the wealthy compete to buy the best works of art (therefore driving up the price of art), but she doesn't clarify why exactly this competition might occur. To address these unanswered questions and further explore the societal phenomenon keeping high art inaccessible to the general public (besides its sheer price), I raise the claim that the elite use art as a status symbol because the nature of aesthetic distinction creates an elitist platform that allows for systematic distancing of the masses and popular appeal.

In "The Critique of Judgement," the philosopher Immanuel Kant examines our faculty of judgment and outlines three forms of delight: the agreeable, the good, and the beautiful. According to Kant, people typically employ these forms of delight when making a judgement. In his book *Collecting Original Art*, Jeffery H. Loria explains that when selling art, "...if a work has the indefinable quality that produces immediate and almost universal appeal, the dealer, confident of sale, boosts the price." Typically, the most expensive works sold at auction

are described as having an indefinable quality. According to Loria, the value of artwork is likely to increase if the work is believed to possess an extraordinary quality that would appeal universally. Kant would describe the quality Loria mentions as "the beautiful." Kant argues that this extraordinary quality results in a sense of contemplation—apart from any interest—for the viewer, and the ability for everyone to enjoy and appreciate the object. To clarify, for an aesthetic judgement to be entirely "disinterested" it must be separate from individual wants and needs. However, what is particularly interesting about both Kant and Loria's statements is that both emphasize a similar reservation when they state that this disinterested contemplation can be experienced universally. Their hesitation indicates that even though both agree that for an object to be considered "beautiful" (and according to Loria therefore considered valuable) the object must possess a contemplative quality that could be universally appreciated, they intend universal to mean only a select few.

Kant further argues that "Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such delight is called beautiful." Kant asserts that possessing true taste requires the ability to judge an object separate from any interest. Therefore, judging an object based on impulsive sensual pleasure or because it achieves a goal, does not convey true taste because these are not purely aesthetic judgements. When describing his philosophy of aesthetic criticism, Kant proclaims that judgement is neither entirely objective or subjective. He argues that individual gratification is not a purely aesthetic judgment because it was made based on an artwork's "agreeableness to subjective sensation." Additionally, pleasure based on fulfilling a goal is not a pure aesthetic judgment. Kant explains that, "That is good which by means of reason commends itself by its mere concept." This means that an object delights a viewer because of some objective reason. Therefore Kant states, "Of all these three kinds of delight, that of taste in the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight; for with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason extorts approval." In other words, making a pure aesthetic judgement that conveys true taste requires the ability to experience complete disinterest toward an object. Kant additionally argues,

Hunger is the best sauce; and people with a healthy appetite relish everything, so long as it is something they can eat. Such delight, consequently, gives no indication of taste having anything to say to the choice. Only when men have got all they want can we tell who among the crowd has taste or not.

Kant uses an analogy to argue that only when individuals have everything they want can they truly appreciate an object apart from any personal interest. By using food to represent an object that everyone needs, Kant claims that only individuals who have achieved a certain level of comfort are able to express refined taste. In contrast, Kant believes individuals who have not reached this level (and are still "hungry" for food for instance) are unable to make disinterested critical judgements because hunger creates need and therefore cannot convey proper taste. Through this analogy Kant is making the observation that refined taste requires a certain kind of lifestyle in which there is ample time for disinterested, theoretical contemplation.

In "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste," Pierre Bourdieu points out that Kant's definition of pure aesthetic judgment conveniently leaves out the majority of the population. Kant argues that the more freedom and distance individuals have from necessity in their lives, the more they are able to make disinterested critiques about the indescribable quality of art. Bourdieu takes issue with Kant's definition of pure aesthetic judgment that supposedly defines taste. Bourdieu argues that it is no accident that the popular aesthetic is the negative opposite of the Kantian aesthetic. He explains that while Kant believes pure disinterested judgment that conveys taste requires a certain level of freedom, only a select group of wealthy elites maintain this type of lifestyle and have the authority to make these types of judgements. In comparison to the wealthy elite class, "working-class people, who expect every image to fulfill a function, if only that of a sign, refer, often explicitly, to norms of morality or agreeableness in all their judgments." Bourdieu explains that the working class typically enjoy art that clearly serves a function, is obvious to understand, and is pretty to look at. He further argues that because the lower class work incredibly hard to fulfill their basic needs like food, water, and shelter, they appreciate objects based on practicality because they do not have time to waste on anything else. Therefore, "Nothing is more alien to popular consciousness than the idea of an aesthetic pleasure that, to put it in Kantian terms, is

independent of the charming of the senses.” Bourdieu observes that Kant’s aesthetic criticism refuses art that is either practical or agreeable to the senses, and also happens to be the antithesis of upper class appeal. While the elite class’s distance from necessity allows for theoretical contemplation, the working class people have specific (and urgent) interests to fulfill, and have no time for art that fails to satisfy them, much less art that seems explicitly to reject the very idea of fulfillment.

I argue that art is the ideal object for the wealthy to use to systematically distance themselves from the general public, because aesthetic underpinnings of high art creates a platform for elitism in the art market. Because the elite class is able to claim an aesthetic disposition, this “tends to bracket off the nature and function of the object represented and to exclude any ‘naïve’ reaction—horror at the horrible, desire for the desirable, pious reverence for the sacred...” or any other ethical and practical responses commonly expressed by the working class. This indicates that whether the elite class is aware or not, they are judging high art from a Kantian perspective that is only available to a select wealthy few. Bourdieu’s explanation of the Kantian aesthetic disposition implies that refined taste is not something available to everyone. Because refined taste is based on a person’s individual freedom from necessity, it is the polar opposite of how the working class think, which further unifies the elite and prevents the working class from participating. Therefore, art is the ideal object for the wealthy to use to distance themselves from popular opinion because the very act of aesthetic criticism used to judge the value of art is elitist in itself.

The Elite Perspective on Why to Buy

Conversely, while Bourdieu argues that the elite are able to judge art from a disinterested perspective because they are able to distance themselves from urgent necessity, the wealthy elite would most likely deny that their distance from basic need has anything at all to do with their unique theoretical judgement and carefully refined tastes. After analyzing several different accounts of wealthy buyers at Christie’s and Sotheby’s, I discovered some interesting similarities. For example, Francis Bacon’s *Three Studies of Lucian Freud*, sold for \$142.4 million dollars in 2013. One of the bidders during the auction, Hong Gyu Shin, said he found the work of art “irresistible” and explained he bid so high on the work because, “I loved that painting and I couldn’t control myself.” Based on his quotation in the *New York Times* article, Mr. Shin is arguing that he was willing to spend a large amount of money on a painting because he was unable to control himself. However, I am not sure I buy into his reasoning. While I cannot prove that Mr. Shin is intentionally attempting to deny this perspective, I argue that he is judging Bacon’s work from a Kantian perspective. Because Mr. Shin never admits to the exact reason he found the painting so infatuating other than the fact that it was simply “irresistible,” I believe he is attempting to claim that there is an indefinable quality that enticed him to bid a large amount of money on this particular work of art. Further, his ability to perceive the indefinable quality and value of Bacon’s work that made the work seem “irresistible” to him was not because of his refined taste (as he would probably like the readers of the *New York Times* to think), but rather his fundamental power over urgent necessity that has given him the freedom to make theoretical distinctions.

Whether Mr. Shin realizes it or not, his quotation effectively creates an elitist platform in which he is able to distance himself from the general public because his aesthetic criticism of the artwork refuses everything the majority values and appreciates. Bourdieu further supports the claim that the elite class would like to believe that their tastes and preferences are simply accidental by stating,

This claim to aristocracy is less likely to be contested than any other, because the relation of the ‘pure,’ ‘disinterested’ disposition to the conditions which make it possible, i.e., the material conditions of existence which are rarest because most freed from economic necessity, has every chance of passing unnoticed. The most ‘classifying’ privilege thus has the privilege of appearing to be the most natural one.

Bourdieu is arguing that the wealthy elite’s ability to make disinterested theoretical judgements as a result of their immense privilege is often easily overlooked. By judging a work of art from a Kantian perspective, whether they realize it or not, the elite class is affirming their power over urgent needs. And further, because purely aesthetic

criticism is defined as rejecting everything the working-class values, their disinterested criticism creates a platform for elitism and segregates the rest of the general public from participating in the market for high art. Lastly, Bourdieu argues that the ultimate sign of privilege is not expressing disinterested aesthetic criticism, but rather denying that refined tastes and preferences are in any way connected to a distance from necessity. When the elite class claims their tastes and preferences towards art are simply accidental or “natural,” Bourdieu argues that this is the most classifying privilege because the elite are claiming they were just born superior to the working-class. Therefore, aesthetic criticism becomes less about autonomous judgment and more about consciously or unconsciously distinguishing themselves from the masses.

In addition, according to Sotheby’s *American Art* catalogue (2013), Norman Rockwell’s *Saying Grace* sold for approximately \$46 million dollars at auction. However, James B. Stewart explains in his article, “Norman Rockwell’s Art, Once Sniffed at, Is Becoming Prized” that Norman Rockwell’s artwork was not always considered valuable. In 2010 when the Norman Rockwell exhibit opened at the Smithsonian Museum of American Art, the exhibition was bashed by a long line of art critics for being trite, unoriginal, and clichéd. Many critics demonized Rockwell’s art because his subject matter was “comfortable” and resembled that of a “...lowly calendar artist whose work was unrelated to the lofty ambitions of art.” But then in 2013 when *Saying Grace* set a new auction record for Rockwell, Sotheby’s described the significance of Rockwell’s work by stating, “Once we look closer, the artist’s message reveals itself...*Saying Grace* presents American culture as a place where differing values and customs are accepted.” Sotheby’s indicates that Rockwell’s artwork was appealing and therefore highly valued at auction because it possessed an important message related to traditional American values. According to Kant, Sotheby’s reasoning would be defined as “the good” because the work delights the viewer by accomplishing the goal of possessing an important message. However, as stated earlier, Kant does not consider this form of delight to be a pure aesthetic judgement and therefore does not convey refined taste.

In Bourdieu’s opinion, classes with the closest social space are likely to face the most opposition in terms of tastes and preferences. In contrast, elite classes tend to rehabilitate the tastes and preferences of the lowest class because enough distance exists that they are no longer faced with the anxiety of having to consistently distinguish themselves from the masses. Therefore, because Rockwell’s paintings depict typical everyday American life that resonate well with the general public, the elite class automatically began distancing themselves from his works by calling it unoriginal and clichéd. However, in Stewart’s article he interviews a critic named Michael Moses who explains Rockwell’s sudden popularity by saying, “Rockwell was so out of favor, there was ample room for appreciation.” However, similar to my previous skepticism towards Mr. Shin, I do not think I buy into Moses’ argument either. Based on Bourdieu’s argument about class differences, I argue that Rockwell’s *Saying Grace* was so highly valued at auction because the elite class had created enough distance between themselves and the class of people that Rockwell’s paintings represented. Therefore, the elite were able to highly prize the work of art out of a sense of irony towards the message, not because they actually related to the depiction of traditional American values. Since this distance has been established, Sotheby’s was able to appreciate Rockwell’s message from the Kantian perspective of “the good” almost ironically. While Sotheby’s claims that buying a Rockwell allows one to own a timeless piece of American history, the lifestyle the work actually idealizes is most likely not one that is desirable to the wealthy elite. Therefore, Moses’ statement further perpetuates the elitist platform created by art criticism. Rockwell paintings had in fact become “so out of favor” in comparison to most high art because of the elite’s desire to distance and reject the general public values. But instead of taking ownership over their distance from necessity, Moses and the rest of the elite class (wealthy enough to buy high art) are denying that their privilege has anything to do with their refined tastes and preferences or the sudden reappraisal of Rockwell’s paintings.

Objectivity vs. Subjectivity

The elite class’s denial of systematic distancing creates an interesting and puzzling paradox. While not only asserting that tasteful art must possess an indefinable quality and also denying that their individual prefer-

ences are in anyway related to their privilege, art buyers and experts are also implying that what is subjective can also in fact be objective. For instance, there have been many different publications seeking to educate the general public on the art market or how to become a knowledgeable collector of art. These publications are formatted as a guide, and list objective rules that define how to determine if a work of art is valuable. However, while these authors attempt to create objective rules that anyone can employ in order to be a knowledgeable collector of high art, they ultimately contradict themselves by arguing that an art expert must employ both objective and subjective reasoning.

For example, Jeffery H. Loria explains in *Collecting Original Art* that all well informed collectors employ their self-defining notion of taste. Loria further states that, “No one buys taste; some people have it instinctively, but many people acquire it—not only by reading and by educating themselves, but also by training their eyes and their sensitivities.” According to Loria, accumulating high art is an occupation available to everyone as long as they take the time to educate themselves. And yet, Loria’s statement is full of contradictions. While he starts off by saying that some people instinctively have taste, he then adds that some people can learn taste through training. This implies an interesting paradox. While wealthy buyers claim anyone can follow objective rules and become a collector of art, at the same time they argue that art must possess an indefinable subjective quality that cannot be taught. Loria’s statement both reaffirms the elite’s denial that their aesthetic criticism has anything to do with their privilege, and also acts as a way to further distance themselves from popular opinion. And yet, it could also relate to the possibility that perhaps the art critics themselves are ultimately unsure if an artwork’s value resides in an objective quality, a subjective one, or both.

Initially, I argued that art is valued based on the buyer’s individual tastes and preferences, which are governed by the buyer’s desire for a clear narrative of authenticity. This narrative includes a list of objective structures that art buyers have universally agreed must be satisfied in order for the work of art to be deemed valuable. However, based on Kant’s idea of pure aesthetic criticism, I argue that art buyers claim that all expensive art possesses a certain indescribable quality apart from any interest. Therefore, art buyers tend to find themselves in a strange predicament between the objective and the subjective. While I think that in some cases the paradoxical nature of art criticism can be explained by elite’s desire to distance themselves from the vast majority, I believe that at their core art buyers are frantically uncertain about what makes high art so valuable. While I think they want to believe, and some even advertise whole-heartedly that art collecting can be taught, they contradict themselves by saying there is always something more: a quality that cannot be taught and that they are completely unable to define.

I further argue that the art critic’s need to “satisfy” a structure within a narrative of authenticity exemplifies their need to define the indefinable. In Mark Denaci’s “The image of Fetishism: Derrida and the ‘Truth’ in Art,” he summarizes Jacques Derrida’s argument in “Restitutions of the Truth in Painting” regarding a Van Gogh painting by stating,

Derrida suggests that the shoes, empty, unlaced, and left aside, provoke an anxiety in both Heidegger and Shapiro to refill them, retie the laces around a foot, and put them back to work, back into their ‘proper’ use. This anxiety relates to that of the art historian who seeks to ‘restitute’ unstable, ‘disembodied’ images to their proper historical and material grounding.

Denaci’s quotation explains that when looking at Van Gogh’s painting, the two scholars, Meyer Schapiro and Martin Heidegger, experience a sense of anxiety. Because the painting depicts a pair of shoes and nothing more, the subject matter becomes a free floating fictional image disembodied from its original meaning. Further, Denaci equates the way Schapiro and Heidegger are attempting to restitute the shoes to their original intended use to the way art historians attempt to restitute images within paintings to their correct historical meaning. Similarly, art buyers desire to “satisfy” or “fulfill” a structure within a narrative of authenticity for the same reasons. Because the majority of high art is judged from a Kantian perspective of aesthetic criticism, “purely beautiful” art is perceived as having an inexpressible quality that even Kant himself never explicitly defines. Shapiro and Heideg-

ger’s desire for restitution within the Van Gogh painting, illustrates the same sense of restitution art buyer’s seek within the work of art they purchase so they can define the indefinable quality that all valuable art supposedly possesses.

Derrida also argues that while both Shapiro and Heidegger want to restitute the shoes to their rightful owner, they can never do that. On the contrary, Derrida implies that the viewer of the Van Gogh painting can only rent out the shoes and put them on display for their own personal use. Similarly, when buying a painting, an art buyer is attempting to gain a certain feeling that expensive painting is said to evoke. Therefore, he rents out the work of art in order to get to the center of this indescribable feeling that is the basis of true taste and pure aesthetic criticism. But, what the buyer does not realize is that this is impossible. And, in desperately trying to satisfy a structure that will deem a work of art valuable, the buyer fails to realize that this structure will never actually be satisfied. And instead, the buyer will continue digging endlessly for more.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I originally believed that art was deemed valuable based on whether or not it fulfilled a narrative of authenticity, and that the rising prices of art were mainly caused by the elite class’s perception. However, I have realized that the topic of placing value on art is much more complex than I initially thought. While newspaper articles would like to advertise that the rising prices in the art market are essentially due to the top one percent driving up the price of art, this actually is most likely due to the wealthy’s aesthetic criticism, which creates a platform for elitist thinking and systematically distances from popular appeal. At the same time, there seems to be an interesting paradox within art criticism that the Kantian perspective does not fully explain. Furthermore, art buyers are sincerely unsure of what the “indefinable quality” actually entails, so they continue to purchase expensive high art to calm this feeling of anxiety. In the end, the tension between the objective and the subjective that exists within Kant’s theory of aesthetic criticism will always leave art buyers digging for the “something else” in order to satisfy a feeling that can, in fact, never be satisfied.



Photo Credit:
Sonja Wolke

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Sydney Fallone

Exploring the Economic Development Divergence in Northern and Southern Italy: Testing the Impact of Civicness

ABSTRACT: Throughout my semester in Italy, I noticed a remarkable difference in living standards between Northern and Southern Italy. In the years since World War II, the South of Italy began to substantially lag behind the North economically and developmentally, in addition having an increase in emigration from the South to the North. Upon investigating the school of thought known as civicness, as defined by Edward Banfield and Robert Putnam, it becomes clear that varying levels of civicness may be responsible for this inequality. Of five variables used to operationalize civicness, political involvement, societal trust, present organizational ties, interest in politics, and paper readership, only political involvement did not indicate a statistically significant difference between the North and the South. This data, although only focusing on the year 1972, illustrates that there is a difference in civicness during this time period, which may explain the consistent divergence in economic development.

KEYWORDS: civicness, economic divergence, mezzogiorno

During my semester abroad in Italy, I had the opportunity to travel throughout the Italian peninsula. While in Venice and Milan in Northern Italy, my extensive time spent in Rome in Central Italy, and trips to Naples and Palermo, Sicily in Southern Italy, I became acutely aware of the divergence in living standards and development throughout the country. It was apparent that a robust institutional framework efficiently guided Northern Italy. The Metro operated in a timely fashion, the streets were spotless, and garbage was collected. In addition, traffic rules were followed without the drone of beeping, screeching, and yelling from drivers, and there was a noticeable air of civility when you walked down the street and interacted with Northern Italians. As I went further South, I noticed less and the less of these characteristics. In Southern Italy, public transportation was unpredictable and many times, did not arrive at all. Streets were not well kept and were often riddled with uncollected bags of garbage and animal excrement. Traffic rules and customs were disregarded, which led to chaotic and aggressive road conditions. Even worse, while walking around Palermo, Sicily, my friend and I were beeped at and verbally harassed by men.

Following my experience traveling throughout Italy, I became intrigued as to why there was such a noticeable and significant difference in ways of life and living standards between the North and South. Italy is a stunning country, but there is a significant lag in development between the North and South that is causing Italy to stand out among its industrialized and economically integrated European neighbors.

The History of Inequality

This divergence has not always been characteristic of Italy. One of the most widely accepted views among scholars is that Northern and Southern Italy, also known as "mezzogiorno," were in roughly equal positions at

the time of unification in 1861 (Eckaus, 286). Existing literature identifies the mezzogiorno as encompassing the island of Sicily, Sardinia, and the regions of Abruzzo, Apulia, Basilicata, Campania, Calabria, Molise, Sicily, and Sardinia, and the North comprising the remaining regions in Italy. In terms of GDP per capita, there was no true gap between Southern and Northern Italy prior to the Italian unification. In 1861 there was a substantial parity between the two areas, if not a slight advantage in per capita GDP towards Southern Italy in 1861 (Daniele, 10). While the two areas of Italy sported an unremarkable difference of five percent until 1881, Daniele's analysis pointed out a difference between per capita income in Northern and Southern Italy of about seven percent in 1891 (Daniele, 10). By 1913, the gap between the two had grown to 20 percent in favor of Northern Italy (Daniele, 10).

Between 1876 and 1900, shortly after unification, about 5,250,000 Italians emigrated, 71 percent of whom were from the North and Centre (Daniele, 5). The highest numbers of emigrants originated from the regions of Veneto, Venetia Giulia and Piedmont, which were relatively underdeveloped areas of the North (Daniele, 6). After 1900, the flow of emigrants from Southern regions became prominent as soon as the Mezzogiorno began losing ground in the process of economic modernization (Daniele, 5). The turn of the century was a time of extraordinary emigration, generally heavier in the South, to the point where at some times and places it exceeded the natural increase in population (Daniele, 8). The concentration of emigrants in the younger, more productive demographics left the South with a working force of deteriorating quality (Daniele, 9).

In 1861, the employment structure in Italy was typical of pre-industrial economies. The main share of the labor force, which rested at 64 percent, worked in agriculture while the rest was equally distributed between industry and services (Daniele, 12). In the first decade after national unification, there was not yet a clear difference in industrialization between the North and South (Daniele, 12). By 1891, industry employed 19 percent of the Italian labor force; 21 percent of the labor force was employed by industry in the North and 17 percent in the South (Daniele, 12).

Although there was relative parity between the two regions during the time of unification in 1861, in the 155 years since, Northern and Southern Italy have taken markedly different development paths, which are illustrated in their GDP per capita, emigration, and employment statistics, especially in the decades following World War II. In the 1950's, Northern Italy was involved in an intense process of industrialization, which changed the economic geography of Italy (Rodgers, 115). Industrialization increased in the South, as well, although the differences with the most developed Northern regions continued to be remarkable. In 1951, in all of the Southern regions, per capita income was below 75 percent of the overall Northern Italian average, meaning that the South significantly lagged in growth compared to the North (Rodgers, 117).

The economic inequity between the two regions was further exacerbated by the effects of emigration. From 1951 to 1971, more than four million people emigrated from the South towards the North, diminishing their human capital stock and labor force (Rodgers, 117).

Furthermore, employment in the mezzogiorno grew approximately two-thirds the level of the North (Rodgers, 118). In 1951, industry comprised 31.0 percent of the Italian labor force. 22.7 percent were employed by industry in the South and 34.9 percent in the North. By 1971, industry employed 44.1 percent of the labor force throughout Italy: 35.0 percent in the South and 48.3 percent in the North (Daniele, 4). During that twenty-year span, the divergence in employment between the North and South did not diminish; instead it continued to widen. Overall, during this phase of Italian industrialization, the South lost considerable ground in comparison to the North and the development gap widened continuously (Rodgers, 117).

Within the past decade, the divergence in Northern and Southern Italian development is still readily apparent, especially following the 2008-2009 Great Recession. In 2011, GDP per capita in the South was 58 percent of that in the North (A Tale of Two Economies; Italy's Regional Divide). In addition, between 2001 and 2014, the economy in the South atrophied by seven percent, whereas Northern Italy grew by two percent (A Tale of Two Economies; Italy's Regional Divide).

The South continues to be crippled by continued emigration patterns northward and abroad. Net migra-

tion from South to North between 2001 and 2013 was more than 700,000 people, 70 percent of whom were aged between 15 and 34, and more than a quarter of which were graduates, representing a considerable outsource of newly educated, skilled and knowledgeable individuals (A Tale of Two Economies; Italy's Regional Divide). In addition, employment in the South currently rests at 40 percent, which is lower than in any country in the European Union, while employment in the North is 64 percent (A Tale of Two Economies; Italy's Regional Divide). Post-recession data also shows that of nearly one million Italians who became unemployed between 2007 and 2014, 70 percent were Southerners. During that same period, Italy's aggregate workforce contracted by four percent, while the South's workforce contracted by 10.7 percent (A Tale of Two Economies; Italy's Regional Divide).

In terms of the current employment structure, industry employs 31.8 percent of the population, 24.2 percent of the labor force in the South and 34.8 in the North (Daniele, 4). Aside from the existing divergence between the North and South, it is evident from the data that the damage inflicted by the recession affected the South disproportionately compared to the North, adding to the South's disadvantage. This divergence is not new, nor is it uniquely Italian. Why has Southern Italy continually lagged in economic growth and development compared to Northern Italy in the decades following World War II?

Civicsness as cause of Inequality

One prominent school of thought has emerged in response to this heavily debated question. It argues that civicsness, also known as civic community, explains the economic development divergence between the North and South. Two scholars, Edward Banfield and Robert Putnam, have been significant contributors to this school of thought. Edward Banfield found a lack of civicsness, defined as participation and engagement in social networks, in his study of a small Southern Italian rural community in the 1950's (Ballarino, 244). During his research, he observed a phenomenon called "amoral familism," which is behavior that is notoriously resistant to cooperation and to any kind of association that stems beyond the nuclear family. Individuals are unable to achieve and maintain formal organizations, unwilling to involve themselves in any public problem or activity in the interest of the community, and thoroughly self-serving, shortsighted, and fickle in their political acts (Silverman, 1). To make this behavior intelligible, Banfield suggested that the people behave at all times as if they were following a "rule," which he views as the dominant ethos of the community: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family, and assume that all others will do likewise" (Silverman, 1).

Building upon Banfield's work, another scholar, Robert D. Putnam of Harvard University, argues that civicsness and civic community are defined as "interest in public issues and devotion to public causes" (244). Further, he defines it as a self-reinforcing syndrome of participation and engagement in social networks that is manifested in a profusion of recreational and cultural associations, high rates of newspaper readership, political participation, especially voting in national elections, and high turnout for political referendums (Solt, 124). Furthermore, Putnam contends that politics and economies are driven by civics and that civicsness is the main cause of the differential economic development and performance in Northern and Southern Italy (Bellarino, 244). Putnam has bolstered these views by finding a strong correlation between institutional performance and levels of civicsness that characterize Italy's Northern and Southern regions (Bellarino, 244).

Broadly speaking, scholars agree with Banfield and Putnam, arguing that the variation in Italy's regional governments and economies are the result of differing level of 'civic community' (Helliwell, 295). High levels of civic community, which include engaging in social, political, and cultural networks with people who live and work in a given society, enable that society and its institutions, especially economic and political institutions, to function effectively (Helliwell, 295). When citizens participate and hold their institutions accountable, economic performance tends to improve (Helliwell, 295).

Methods

I believe that the civicsness school of thought best explains the divergence in economic development between Northern and Southern Italy. To demonstrate that civicsness elucidates the divergence in economic

development, I plan to collect statistical data on a multitude of indicators from Samuel H. Barnes and Giacomo Sani's 1972 Italian Mass Election Survey, which was conducted following the 1972 parliamentary elections in Italy (Barnes). A representative stratified national sample was drawn from lists of voters in the 1841 electoral precincts across the country, and interviews were conducted focusing on respondents' political interest, behavior and attitudes, their party identification and organizational memberships, trust, trust in government, reaction to the multi-party system, and views on left-right political differences. Overall, this survey collected data on 250 variables. Due to the enormity of this study, specifically the number of precincts and variables, I will focus on the 201 voter precincts within the Lombardy province, which will represent the North, and the 148 voter precincts within Sicily, which will represent the South.

Additionally, to operationalize civicness, I plan to focus on five specific variables that indicate and embody the principles of civicness, which include political involvement, trust scale, present organizational ties, interest in politics, and daily or weekly paper readership. By looking at this survey of data, I hope to discern whether the values of Southern Italians differ compared to those of Northern Italians. I would expect for there to be a statistically significant difference between Northern Italy, represented by the Lombardy province, and Southern Italy, represented by the Sicily province, for each of the five abovementioned variables. Statistical significance is defined as the likelihood that a relationship between two or more variables is caused by something other than random chance. Within this study, if at least three of the five variables are statistically significant, then I believe civicness explains the divergence in economic development between the North and South.

Given the extensive literature on the role of civics in development literature, it is important to determine the extent to which civicness contributed to the divergence in economic development and why Southern Italy fared so differently compared to the North. My findings may shed light on what factors impact development and why some regions may lag behind while others are able to advance. Furthermore, my study may illuminate what steps other countries suffering from divergent levels of regional development should take to converge economic growth and development.

Results

Using the SPSS Statistics Viewer program, I was able to access the data set and run statistical tests to better understand the variables and how they compared when looking at Lombardy and Sicily. Initially, I ran a Descriptive Statistics Test of the data, which aggregated the number of precincts within each province. I focused on two specific provinces: The Lombardy province, labeled with the region ID number three has 301 precincts, representing 16.3 percent of the precincts in Italy. In addition, Sicily is labeled with the region ID number 17, and consists of 148 precincts, which represents 8.0 percent of the voter precincts in Italy.

I then used these region ID numbers to run a means test, which is a statistical procedure that summarizes and compares differences in descriptive statistics across one or more factors, in this case, across the Lombardy and Sicily regions. The results of this means test are summarized in Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the appendix. For each region, specifically Lombardy (region 3) and Sicily (region 17), the means test aggregated survey responses for each of my five target variables from each voter precinct into one mean average for each region. In addition, the standard deviation and the number of precincts (N) for each region were also denoted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Together, the mean, standard deviation, and number of responses are denoted as the "descriptive statistics."

After obtaining the descriptive statistics, I ran a statistical Summary Independent-Samples T Test, which compares the means of both regions in order to determine whether there is statistical evidence that the means are significantly different. I used a 95-percent confidence interval for this test, statistically meaning that if repeated samples were taken and the 95-percent confidence interval was computed for each sample, 95-percent of the intervals would contain the population mean. For each of the five variables, I ran a Summary Independent-Samples T Test that utilized the descriptive statistics for both the Lombardy region (region 3) and the Sicily region (region 17) to test the statistical significance between the two areas.

The first variable is daily or weekly newspaper readership. In 1841 voter precincts, researchers asked the

following: do you follow the electoral campaign in newspapers? The following are the options and the number of precincts that identified with each option, respectively: 1. Daily: 213, 2. Once in a while: 398, 3. Never: 1222, and 0. No answer: 8 (Barnes). Of the 1841 precincts, 301 (N) were from Lombardy (region 3), the mean value of Lombardy's precinct response was .470, and the standard deviation was .656 (Figure 1: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). Additionally, for Sicily (region 17), 148 of the 1841 total precincts belonged to this region, the mean value of Sicily's precincts was .300, and the standard deviation was .622 (Figure 2: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). Below is Figure 3, summarizing the descriptive statistics for both regions and the results of the Summary Independent-Sample T-Test, which aims to show the significance of the daily or weekly newspaper readership values between Lombardy and Sicily.

Summary T-Test

Summary Data				
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
3-read daily or weekly paper?	301.000	.470	.656	.038
17-read daily or weekly paper?	148.000	.300	.622	.051

Independent Samples Test					
	Mean Difference	Std Error Difference	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Equal variances assumed	.170	.065	2.625	447.000	.009

The important piece of information from the independent samples test is the significance (2-tailed) value which is .009 or .9%. This value is statistically significant because it is less than five percent of the 95 percent confidence interval, meaning that there is a statistically significant difference between Northern and Southern daily and weekly newspaper readership.

The second variable is political involvement. Unfortunately, documentation for this variable, specifically the question posed and the precincts response, was not provided in the codebook. However, I was able to obtain the descriptive statistics for each region. The mean value of the Lombardy's precinct responses was .08 and the standard deviation was .276 (Figure 1: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). Furthermore, for Sicily, the mean value of the 149 precincts was .06 and the standard deviation was .240 (Figure 2: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). A summary of each region's descriptive statistics and the results of the Summary Independent-Sample T-Test are located in Figure 4 below.

Summary T-Test

Summary Data

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
3-political involvement	301.000	.080	.276	.016
17-political involvement	148.000	.060	.240	.020

Independent Samples Test

	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Equal variances assumed	.020	.027	.753	447.000	.452

The p-value for this test is .452 or 42.5 percent, which means that there is not a statistically significant difference between political involvement between Lombardy (region 3) and Sicily (region 17).

The third variable is societal trust. Unfortunately, the codebook did not contain documentation for this variable, specifically the question posed and the precincts responses. However, the descriptive statistics for each region were available. Of the 1841 total precincts, 265 precincts reported on this variable in Lombardy. The mean value of their responses was .82 and the standard deviation was .848 (Figure 1: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). In addition, 129 of the 148 total precincts in Sicily responded, the mean value of their responses was 1.00, and the standard deviation was .866 (Figure 2: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). Below is Figure 5, which summarizes the descriptive statistics for both regions and the results of the Summary Independent-Sample T-Test.

Summary T-Test

Summary Data

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
3-Trust Scale	265.000	.820	.848	.052
17-Trust Scale	129.000	1.000	.866	.076

Independent Samples Test

	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Equal variances assumed	-.180	.092	-1.963	392.000	.050

The two-tailed p-value is .050 or 5 percent, right at the cusp of statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence interval, which means that there is a statistically significant difference between societal trust between the North and South, specifically the provinces of Lombardy and Sicily.

The fourth variable is present organizational ties. Researchers asked subjects if they have membership in the following civil society organizations at the present time. The following were the options and the number of the 1841 precincts that identified with each option, respectively: 1. CGIL: 125; 2. UIL: 14; 3. CISL: 47; 4. CISNAL: 2; 5. Coldiretti: 43; 6. Aliansa: 5; 7. Others: 26; 9. No answer: 3; and 0. None: 1576 (Barnes). All 301 of Lombardy's precincts reported; the mean value of their responses was .49, and the standard deviation was 1.387 (Figure 1: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). Meanwhile, all of Sicily's precincts also reported; the mean value of their responses was .09, and the standard deviation was .546 (Figure 2: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). Figure 6, below, reiterates the descriptive statistics and displays the results of the Summary Independent-Samples T Test.

Summary T-Test

Summary Data

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
3-present organizational ties	301.000	.490	1.387	.080
17-present organizational ties	148.000	.090	.546	.045

Independent Samples Test

	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Equal variances assumed	.400	.118	3.380	447.000	.001

The two-tailed p-value is .001 or .1 percent, well under the five percent threshold, indicating a statistically significant difference between present organizational ties in Lombardy and Sicily.

The final variable is interest in politics. During the survey, subjects were asked, are you interested in politics? The following were the options presented and the number of precincts that identified with each option. 1. Very interested: 40; 2. Somewhat interested: 218; 3. Little interest: 538; 4. Not at all interested: 1041; and 0. No answer: 4 (Barnes). In Lombardy, the mean value of all 301 precincts was 3.43, while the standard deviation was .762 (Figure 1: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). For Sicily, the mean value of all 148 precincts response was 3.63 and the standard deviation was .620 (Figure 2: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test in Appendix). The descriptive statistics and the results of the Summary Independent-Samples T Test are displayed in Figure 7 below.

Summary T-Test

Summary Data				
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
3-present organizational ties	301.000	.490	1.387	.080
17-present organizational ties	148.000	.090	.546	.045

Independent Samples Test					
	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Equal variances assumed	.400	.118	3.380	447.000	.001

The results of the Summary Independent-Sample T-Test are statistically significant with a two-tailed p-value of .005 or 5 percent, illustrating a statistically significant difference between interest in politics in the North and South, specifically the provinces of Lombardy (region 3) and Sicily (region 17).

Conclusion

This study aimed to answer the question, why has Southern Italy continually lagged in economic growth and development compared to Northern Italy in the decades following World War II? Based on Putnam and Banfield's extensive research exploring the impact of civiness on divergence economic performance between Northern and Southern Italy, I believed that the civiness school of thought best explained the divergence. Of the five variables used to operationalize civiness, political involvement, societal trust, present organizational ties, interest in politics, and paper readership, only political involvement failed to provide a statistically significant difference between Sicily and Lombardy. Because the other four variables were statistically significant, exceeding the three out of five minimum requirement I initially created, my study proves that there is an overall difference in civiness and thus economic development between Northern and Southern Italy.

This paper makes a strong case for the validity of my hypothesis, aside from political involvement, there is a statistically significant difference between civiness, as measured by societal trust, present organizational ties, interest in politics, and daily or weekly paper readership, between the North, specifically the Lombardy province, and the South, represented by the province of Sicily, thus explaining the divergent economic development between the former and the latter.

Although I use statistical Means Tests and Summary Independent-Sample T-Tests to test the difference in civiness, this 1972 Italian Mass Election Survey data set imposes limitations on my study. I had an extremely difficult time finding any other studies pertaining to this subject that would allow me to test the difference in civiness throughout my intended post-WWII - present timeframe. This data set was the only study I came across that had variables that could be operationalized to measure civiness. Because of this, the results of this paper determine that there is a statistically significant difference in civiness in 1972, not throughout the post-WWII-present period. In the future, it would be interesting to find studies conducted after World War II to see if there is a consistent difference in civiness, and thus economic development, throughout time between Northern and Southern Italy.

Despite these limitations, the conclusions my paper came to are promising because they show that there is evidence of a difference in civiness in the 1970s. It is possible that the difference in civiness may ultimately explain the consistent divergence in economic development. However, that can only be proven through future research.

Appendix:

Figure 1: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test

		Report						
REGION ID NUMBER		VIEW OF ITALIAN SOCIETY	POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT	ITALIAN SOCIETY WORSE?	SCORE: TRUST SCALE	PRES ORGANIZATION TIES	INTEREST IN POLITICS	DAILY OR WEEKLY PAPER?
1	Mean	2.08	.08	2.49	.66	.62	3.47	.45
	N	155	155	155	131	155	155	155
	Std. Deviation	2.064	.268	2.190	.828	1.601	.759	.571
2	Mean	2.69	.05	2.35	.57	.40	3.19	.61
	N	62	62	62	58	62	62	62
	Std. Deviation	1.807	.216	1.976	.819	1.509	.884	1.114
3	Mean	2.53	.08	2.30	.82	.49	3.43	.47
	N	301	301	301	265	301	301	301
	Std. Deviation	1.775	.276	1.947	.848	1.387	.752	.656
4	Mean	2.24	.06	1.44	.31	.41	3.32	.50
	N	34	34	34	29	34	34	34
	Std. Deviation	1.075	.239	.705	.604	1.184	.768	.896
5	Mean	2.48	.06	1.89	.90	.28	3.31	.29
	N	181	181	181	163	181	181	181
	Std. Deviation	1.467	.229	1.531	.893	1.275	.792	.584
6	Mean	2.67	.08	2.00	1.12	1.44	3.36	.77
	N	39	39	39	33	39	39	39
	Std. Deviation	1.938	.270	1.638	.960	2.437	.843	.872

Figure 2: Results of Descriptive Statistics Test

13	Mean	2.55	.09	2.03	1.06	.42	3.54	.32
	N	151	151	151	132	151	151	151
	Std. Deviation	1.500	.291	1.675	.817	1.339	.709	.657
14	Mean	2.69	.13	2.21	.88	.44	3.43	.43
	N	104	104	104	97	104	104	104
	Std. Deviation	1.552	.343	1.593	.869	1.306	.760	.693
15	Mean	4.67	.08	2.46	1.46	.33	3.88	.38
	N	24	24	24	13	24	24	24
	Std. Deviation	3.185	.282	2.637	.877	1.090	.338	.824
16	Mean	3.09	.08	2.37	.63	.31	3.34	.25
	N	65	65	65	49	65	65	65
	Std. Deviation	1.926	.269	1.909	.809	1.060	.815	.434
17	Mean	3.01	.06	2.19	1.00	.09	3.63	.30
	N	148	148	148	129	148	148	148
	Std. Deviation	1.874	.240	1.634	.866	.546	.620	.622
18	Mean	3.00	.39	2.45	.77	.20	2.97	1.18
	N	66	66	66	43	66	66	66
	Std. Deviation	1.569	.492	1.923	.895	.437	.859	1.036
Total	Mean	2.73	.09	2.18	.84	.41	3.40	.47
	N	1841	1841	1841	1589	1841	1841	1841
	Std. Deviation	1.786	.293	1.820	.865	1.297	.796	.757

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